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DAvID  ROSENBERG*
INTRODUCTION
From the  perspective  of the  common  law tradition  of individual  justice,
class  actions  are  a  necessary  evil,  but  an  evil  nonetheless.  That  tradition
projects  the  private  law  adjudicatory  ideal:  the  norms  of right,  duty,  and
remedy are  applied according  to the  specific,  relevant  circumstances  of the
particular  parties  in the  given  case.'  It  promises  the  parties  not  only  their
own  day in court, but a good deal of control over  what is  said and  decided
on that day.
2
Class  actions  loom  as  a  subversive  element  in  this  context  because  they
import  the  processes  of  bureaucratic  justice-a  mode  of  decision-making
associated  with  administrative  agencies,  which  lacks the common  law's tra-
ditional  commitment  to  party control  and  focus  on the  discrete  merits  of
each  claim.3 In contrast to the party initiated and  orchestrated common  law
* Professor  of Law,  Harvard  University.  I  would  like to express  my appreciation  for  the
helpful  criticism  of an  earlier  draft provided  by Richard Stewart,  Thomas  Jackson and Lucien
Bebchuk,  and for the research and editorial assistance provided  by Johnathan Massey,  Leonard
Gail,  Lynn Blaise,  Sally  Hadden and Thomas  Barnett.
1.  See M.  CoimN, LAw  AND  THE SOCIAL  ORDER 251-52  (1933);  M.  FULLER,  Tim  PROBLEMS
OF  JURISPRUDENCE  706  (temp.  ed.  1949);  H.M.  HART & A.  SACKS,  THE  LEGAL  PRocESS:  BAsIC
PROBLEMS  IN  THE  MAKING  AND  APPLICATION  OF  LAW  185  (temp.  ed.  1958);  Hohfeld,  Some
Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as Applied in  Judicial  Reasoning, 23  YALE  L.J.  16  passim
(1913).
2.  R.  FmL,  B.  KAPLAN  &  K.  CLERMONT,  MATERIALS  FOR  A  BAsiC  CoURsE  IN  CrvIL  PRO-
CEDURE  28  (4th ed.  1978).
3.  For a provocative  elaboration  of the statism and collectivism  inherent  in modem  forms
of bureaucratic justice, see generally,  J. MAsHAw,  BUREAUCRATIC  JUSTICE (1983).  Cf.  Michelman,
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100  HARv.  L. REv.  4  (1986).
Class  actions  have frequently been  criticized  for inducing  courts  to ignore  the individualizing
requirements of substantive rules and, instead to adopt averaged,  class-wide standards; see, e.g.,
Scott,  The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5,  38  U.  Cm.  L.  REv.  337  (1971).  Because
they greatly diminish the role of the parties in controlling the process,  class actions are vulnerable
to the further, broader criticism that they undermine important traditional barriers against partisan
and  substantive  judicial  intervention  in the preparation,  presentation,  and  settlement  of claims.
See,  e.g.,  Elliott,  Managerial  Judging and the Evolution of Procedure,  53  U.  Cm. L.  REv.  306
(1986);  Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational  Change: Judicial  Supervision of Public Institutions,
1983  DUKB  L.J.  1265;  Resnik,  Managerial  Judges, 96  HARv.  L.  REv.  374  (1982);  Schuck,  The
Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange  Example, 53  U.  CH.  L.  REv.
337  (1986).
The analogy  to  administrative process  is also  a consistent  staple of class  action commentary.
See,  e.g.,  Phillips  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Shutts,  105  S.  Ct.  2965,  2974  (1985)  ("a class  action
resembles  a 'quasi-administrative  proceeding,  conducted  by the judge.'  " (quoting 3B J.  MooRx
&  J.  KENNEDY,  MOORE'S  FEDERAL  PRACTCE  §  23.45[4-5]  (1984));  Kalven  &  Rosenfield,  The
Contemporary  Function of the Class Suit,  8  U.  Cm.  L.  REv.  684 passim (1941).INDIANA  LAW JOURNAL
trial,  bureaucratic justice gives  decisionmakers  the controlling hand  over the
issue  agenda  as  well  as  over  the  type  and  extent  of  evidence  considered.
4
But bureaucratic justice is most strikingly antithetical to notions of individual
justice because it legitimates the aggregation  and  averaging of circumstances
and  interests of affected individuals in pursuit of the collective  benefits  from
process  efficiency,  outcome  consistency,  and  the  maximum  production  of
substantive  goods.  These  goals are implemented through  "public  law"  pro-
cedures which combine claims for uniform and summary treatment according
to  classifications  based  on  a  set  of  salient,  if  partial,  common  variables
relating  to the  individuals  involved.
5
Nowhere do  class actions seem  a more alien force than in the torts system,
which  epitomizes  the individual justice tradition.
6  The hallmark of this  sys-
tem-at  least  as  a  formal  matter-is  its  adherence  to  the  "private  law"
mode  of case-by-case,  particularized  adjudication.7 Attention  is lavished  on
the particular  details of each  claim to  ensure that the norms of liability and
remedy  are tailored  to the  specific  facts  of the  defendant's  conduct  and its
causal  relationship  to the  plaintiff's  injury.  Every effort  is  made  to  avoid
(or at least minimize) the erroneous redistribution of wealth that occurs  when
4  .See, e.g.,  Mathews  v. Eldridge,  424 U.S.  319,  335-39  (1976);  Richardson  v.  Perales,  402
U.S.  389,  389-401  (1971).
5.  See, e.g.,  Heckler  v.  Campbell,  461  U.S.  458,  461,  468-69  (1983)  (concluding  that there
exist neither statutory nor constitutional obstacles to the use by the Social Security Administration
of a  "grid"  consisting  of a  four-factor  matrix-physical  condition,  age,  education,  and  work
experience-to  categorize  and  determine  individual  disability  claims).
The  dichotomy  between  individual  and  bureaucratic  justice-which,  like most conceptualiza-
tions  is in reality  a  continuum  of tensions  and  contradictions-reflects  another,  more abstract
categorization  in  forms  of  decision  making.  Corresponding  to  the  particularizing  nature  of
individual  justice  is  the context-based  form  of decisionmaking-an  ad  hoc,  multifactored,  bal-
ancing  of competing  interests on a case-by-case  basis.  Juxtaposed  to contextual  decisionmaking
is  the form  that operates  from general classifications  and statistical  rationality.  See Michelman,
supra note 3.  The dichotomy  between  contextual  and  generalized  decisionmaking  has  received
an  ideological  gloss  consistent  with a good  deal  of contemporary legal  scholarship,  an  extreme
example being  the pop socio-political  theory associating the contextual  form  with the  "feminine
voice"  (connoting  "good")  and generalized  form  with the  "male"  (connoting  "bad").  See C.
GrtoAN,  IN  A  DIFFERENT  VOICE  (1982);  Sherry,  Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in  Con-
stitutional Adjudication, 72  YALE  L.  REv.  543  (1986);  see  also, e.g.,  MacKinnon,  Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward  Feminist Jurisprudence,  8 SioNs 635,  638 (1983);  Scales,
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95  YALE  L.J.  1373,  1376-80  (1986).
Both sets of dichotomies  pose deep  epistemological  questions  as to whether knowledge  of the
general-knowledge  founded on probabilistic predictions and inferences-is  separable and distinct
from knowledge  of the particular-knowledge that captures  the intrinsic and  unique  aspects of
a specific situation.
6.  See Chayes,  The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89  HARv.  L.  REv.  1281,
1282-83  (1976);  Sugarman,  Doing Away  with  Tort Law,  73  CAIiF.  L.  Rnv.  555,  604  (1985);
Trangsrud,  Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70  CORNELL L.  REv.  779,  819  & n.
224  (1985).
7.  Rosenberg,  The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A  "Public Law"  Vision
of the  Tort System,  97  HARv.  L.  REv.  849,  900-05  (1984).
[Vol.  62:561MASS  TORTS
innocent  defendants  are  held  liable  or deserving  plaintiffs  denied  compen-
sation."
In mass tort cases involving claims  for personal injury,9 which pose daunt-
ing  problems  of  causation  and  remedy,  the  price  of  individual  justice  is
notoriously  high.'0  Because they typically  involve  complex  factual and  legal
questions,  mass  tort  claims  are  exceedingly,  if not  prohibitively,  expensive
to litigate. The questions of whether the defendant's conduct  failed to satisfy
the governing standard of liability frequently entail interrelated technological
and policy issues that require extensive  discovery,  expertise,  and preparation
to  present  and  resolve  adequately.  Equally  demanding  are  the  causation
issues in mass tort cases,  such as whether the plaintiff's condition was  caused
by exposure  to the  substance  in  question  or  to  some  other  source  of the
same  disease risk."
The case-by-case  mode of adjudication  magnifies this burden by requiring
the parties  and  courts to reinvent  the  wheel  for each  claim.  The  merits  of
each  case are determined  de  novo  even though the major liability issues are
8.  See Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, in 3 TBE TANNER  LECTURES  ON  HtMA  VALUES  91,  120-
21  (S.  McMurrin  ed.  1982);  Posner,  The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of
Tort Law,  10 J.  LEGAL STUD.  187,  190  (1981).
9.  Mass accidents  characteristically  involve hazardous  activities of a relatively  small number
of business enterprises,  which inflict personal  injury and the risk of personal injury on relatively
large  segments  of  the  population.  The  injury and  risk from  such  accidents  may be  sustained
simultaneously or sequentially,  over long periods  of time by members  of the victim population.
In contrast  to mass  disaster  accidents  such as the collapse of two  skywalks in the  lobby of the
Kansas  City Hyatt  Regency  Hotel,  which  killed  114 and seriously  injured  at least  212  others,
see In re Federal Skywalk  Cases, 93  F.R.D.  415  (W.D.  Mo.  1982),  vacated, 680 F.2d  1175  (8th
Cir.  1982),  mass  exposure  accidents involve  long latency disease  striking victims who  are widely
dispersed  over  decades  and territory. See,  e.g.,  Rosenberg,  supra note 7, at 851-55;  Weinstein,
Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11  CoLUM.  J. ENT.  L.  1 (1986).
The catastrophic  effects  from  exposure of millions of insulation  workers to  asbestos,  illustrate
the nature  and consequences  of modem  mass exposure  accidents.  For an insightful and  graphic
report  of the  asbestos  litigation  see,  P.  BRODEUR,  OUTRAGEOUS  MISCONDUcT:  THE  ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON  TwAL  (1985).  For another case history of a mass exposure  accident,  but one which
broadly articulates  and  examines  the complex  questions  of institutional  efficacy  and  legitimacy
such accidents  pose for the tort system,  see P. ScmJcK,  AGENT  ORANGE  ON  TmiAL:  MASS  Toxic
DisAsTRns  m=  COURTS  (1986).
10.  Rubin,  Mass Torts and Litigation  Disasters,  20 GA.  L. REv.  429  (1986);  Weinstein, supra
note 9, at 30 & n.92.
11.  See  Rosenberg,  supra note 7;  Weinstein,  supra note  9, at 9-10.
Other  costly  and  complicated  questions  frequently  raised  by  mass  accident  cases  include
questions of choice of law and extraterritorial  jurisdiction  for claims  asserted by  non-resident,
of the existence  and  extent  of insurance  coverage,  and of allocating the assets and interests  in
bankrupt  defendant  firms  among  present  and  future  victims  and  between  victims  and  other
creditors  and  defendant  firms.  See,  e.g.,  In re Union  Carbide  Corp.  Gas  Plant  Disaster  at
Bhopal,  India in December,  1984,  634 F. Supp.  842  (S.D.N.Y.  1986);  Jemberg,  Insurance  for
Environmental and Toxic Risks: Basic Analysis of the Gap Between Liability and Coverage, 34
FED'N  INS.  CoUNs.  Q.  123  (Winter  1984);  Note,  Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability:
Alternatives to  Contract Analysis, 97  HARv.  L.  RE,.  739  (1984);  Note,  Recent Development,
Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38  VAND.  L.  Ray.
1369,  1395-96  (1985).
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common to every claim arising from the mass tort accident,  and even though
they  may  have  been  previously  determined  several  times  by  full  and  fair
trials.'2  These  costs  exclude  many mass  tort  victims  from  the  system  and
sharply  reduce  the  recovery  for  those  who  gain  access.  Win  or lose,  the
system's  private  law  process  exacts  a  punishing  surcharge  from  defendant
firms  as  well  as  plaintiffs.
These costs  of litigation, which are  borne directly  by the parties,  also cast
a broad  array  of shadow  prices  that  have  widespread  indirect  effects.  The
redundant  adjudication  of mass  tort  claims  thus  consumes  vast  quantities
of public resources,  raising the price of access for other,  sporadic,  types  of
tort claims. 13 Moreover,  even though  most of the claims  arising from  mass
accidents  are  eventually  settled  on  the basis  of recovery  patterns  projected
from  relatively  few trials,
14  the settlement  calculus  will  reflect  the  costs  of
redundant,  de novo,  particularized  adjudication,  as well  as the incentives  of
each party to increase the litigation expenses  for the other.  These conditions
generally  disadvantage  claimants.  Because defendant  firms are  in a position
to  spread  the  litigation  costs  over  the  entire  class  of mass  accident  claims,
while  plaintiffs,  being  deprived  of the economies  of scale afforded  by  class
actions,  can not, the result  will usually be that the firms  will escape the full
loss they have caused and,  after deducting their attorneys'  shares,  the victims
will  receive a relatively  small proportion of any recovery  as  compensation. 5
12.  See Rosenberg,  The Dusting of  America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage,  Cover-up, and
Litigation (Book Review),  99  HAgv.  L.  REv.  1693,  1701  (1986).
13.  I have  elsewhere  distinguished mass  accidents  from  "sporadic"  accidents  such  as auto-
mobile collisions-what  Holmes  termed  "isolated,  ungeneralized  wrongs"-from  "mass"  acci-
dents.  See Rosenberg,  supra note 7,  at 854-55.
14.  See D.  HENSLER,  W.  FatsrnER, M.  SELviN  & P. EBENER,  ASBESTOS  IN THE COuRTS:  TH
CHALLENGE  OF  MASS  Toxic  ToRTs  (1985)  (published  by Rand  Corporation's  Institute  for  Civil
Justice) [hereinafter  D.  HENSLER];  Elliott,  supra note 3, at  324 n.74.
15.  Some recent commentary urges courts and Congress to consider developing and expanding
the  scope  of  class  action  alternatives,  particularly  test-case,  pattern  settlements,  and  trans-
jurisdiction  consolidation  of state  and  federal  claims.  See, e.g.,  Miller  & Crump,  Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co.  v. Shutts,  96 YAlE
L.J.  1, 77  (1986);  Transgrud,  supra note  6 passim. These commentators  fail  to  recognize  the
inadequacy  of such  alternatives  in the toxic tort context  where information,  cost  barriers,  and
the long  latency  periods  of diseases  such  as  cancer  prevent  the  initiation  and  actual  (even  if
informal) joinder of many  claims.
More generally,  when the sole alternative  to case-by-case  adjudication consists  of procedures,
such  as  pattern  settlements  and  consolidation,  which  curtail  redundancy  and  spread litigation
expenses only  partially  or  not  at  all  among  all benefited  claimants,  the  costs  of that residual
degree  of  inefficiency  will  be  deducted  from  the  settlement  offered  to  each  claimant.  The
availability  of a class  action  alternative  to  case-by-case  adjudication  is necessary  if there  is  to
be  any substantial  reduction  of individualizing  litigation  costs and  their bite from the compen-
sation received by victims. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 911-12 & nn.236-37. For these reasons,
and,  in  addition,  because  of  free  rider  problems  and  the  high  costs  of  administration  and
duplicative effort,  the  "litigation  network"  approach, see Coffee, Rescuing the Private  Attorney
General: Why  the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not  Working, 42  MD.  L.  REv.
215,  239-41  & nn.56-57  (1983),  by  which  a  number  of plaintiff lawyers  voluntarily coordinate
and  share the expense and fruits  of their discovery  work,  will rarely if ever serve as an efficient
and  substantively  adequate  alternative to  class  actions.
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As a consequence,  the tort system's primary objectives  of compensation and
deterrence  are seriously jeopardized."
Despite  their  potential  for  reducing  litigation  costs  and  burdens,  and,
consequently,  enhancing  the  system's  capacity  to  achieve  its compensation
and  deterrence  objectives,  class  actions  have consistently  received  a  hostile
reception in mass tort cases.17 In opposing  class actions,  these  decisions  and
supporting  commentary  draw  upon the  individual  justice  tradition  and  its
rejection  of  the  modes  of  bureaucratic  justice." 8  The  common  premise  of
these and similar objections to mass tort class actions is that the bureaucratic
justice of class  treatment-the  collectivization  of claims for aggregative  and
averaged  disposition-achieves  administrative  goals  of  efficiency,  consist-
ency,  and  maximum  substantive  output  by  subordinating  the  interests  of
individual  victims  (although not  of defendant  firms)  to the interests  of the
16.  See generally Rosenberg, supra note 7,  at 900-05.
17.  See generally Williams,  Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98  F.R.D. 323
(1983);  see, e.g.,  In re Asbestos  School Litig.,  104  F.R.D.  422 (E.D.  Pa.  1984),  aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 789  F.2d  996  (3d  Cir.  1985),  vacated, 791  F.2d  920  (3rd  Cir.  1986);  In  re
Bendectin  Prods.  Liab.  Litig.,  749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.  1984).
Although the wasteful and abusive consumption of resources  by mass tort cases  is well  known,
the  courts  have  tended  to  discount  these  problems,  giving  the  demands  of individual  justice
almost  automatic priority  over the need for  class action efficiencies.  See Trangsrud,  supra note
6, at 819.  In part, this response may  be a product of limited perception  of the problems.  Courts
rarely  experience  the  effects of this inefficiency  directly or recognize  their  systemic implications
on  compensation  and  deterrence.  This shortsightedness  may be  due to the detailed character  of
the  very inquiry  required to fulfill the mandate of individual  justice in any given  case.  Concen-
tration  on  the particulars  is  likely  to obscure  patterns  and  connections  with other  cases.  See
Chayes,  Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96  HARv.  L.  REV.  4,  27-28
(1982);  Fiss,  Groups  and the Equal  Protection Clause, 5 Pmxn.  & PUB. A.  107 (1976);  Rosenberg,
supra note  7,  at 885  & n.141.
Moreover,  complexity compounded  by  high litigation costs  also skews  liability  theories in the
direction  of more  easily  provable  particularistic  claims,  such  as product  manufacturing  defect
claims  predicated  on alleged  departures  from a  defendant  firm's  professed  standard of quality
and  performance,  and  away  from  more  programmatic  challenges  to  the  standard  itself.  Cf.
Schwartz,  Foreword: Understanding  Products Liability, 67  CAtiF.  L.  REv.  435,  459-61  &  nn.
157-68  (1979).  Another factor diluting the effects and perception of inefficiency is the decentralized
structure of the tort system,  which disperses  decisionmaking  over time and over widely separated
territorial  and  jurisdictional  domains.  Finally,  only a  minute  fraction  of the  tort claims  that
arise  or that are  filed  ever  come to  the formal  attention of courts;  in  excess  of ninety percent
are  settled.  See  D.  HENSLER,  supra note  14;  H.  Ross,  SETTLED  OUT  OF  COURT:  THE  SOCIAL
PROCESS  OF  INSURANCE  CLAms  AD.usmTmET  (1970);  Dam,  Class Actions: Efficiency,  Compen-
sation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4  J.  LEGAL STUD.  47,  57  (1975);  Weinstein,  supra
note  9,  at  23.  A  number  of  these  settlements  include  court  enforceable  secrecy  provisions
preventing  plaintiffs and their attorneys from disclosing the nature of the claim,  the information
obtained  during discovery,  and the terms of settlement.  See Seattle  Times Co.  v. Rhinehart,  104
S.  Ct. 2199 (1984);  Rosenberg,  supra  note  12,  at 1701.  While some claims may be settled through
the good offices  of judges,  the number of such settlements  is relatively small, and, in any event,
direct judicial oversight of the substantive adequacy of their terms is all but precluded by  relative
lack of information,  and by norms of impartiality and deference to party control. Cf. P. ScmcK,
supra note  9,  at 143;  Resnik, supra note 3.
18.  See supra notes 3-5.
1987]INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
class  as  a whole. 19 Under  this  critique,  the  extent  to which  the  interests  of
individual victims are sacrificed  is measured against the baseline of how their
claims  would fare in separate actions.  Class actions,  for example,  are found
unacceptable  because they transfer control  over the case from the individual
to the  class  as  an  entity,  or  more  accurately,  the  class  attorney.20  In  toxic
tort  cases,  class  actions  are  viewed  as  a  device  for  undermining  causation
requirements  through  averaging.21 Instead  of differentiating  the  "risk  port-
folios"  applicable  to each  victim  in the  exposed  population, 22 class  actions
invite courts to make  causal determinations  on an undifferentiated basis  for
all  members  of  defined  reference  groups  or  subclasses,  or  even  for  all
members  of the  victim  class  as  a whole.
Individual  justice  critiques  of  class  actions  have  little  power  when  the
primary  purpose  of tort  liability  is  taken  to  be  the utilitarian  objective  of
maximizing  welfare  by  deterring  socially  inappropriate  risk-taking.23  The
aggregation  and  averaging  techniques  of bureaucratic  justice  are  not  only
consistent  with  the  social  welfare  justification  for  tort  liability-at  least,
when defendant  firms are not on the whole  under or overcharged-but  they
also  produce  the  positive  benefits  of  lower  administrative  costs.2A  When,
however,  tort liability  serves  to vindicate  rights to  personal  security  trans-
gressed  by a defendant's  wrongful  conduct,  the individual justice arguments
against class  actions  may, depending  on the normative content  of the rights
posited,  suggest the location of certain outside limitations  on the use of class
actions  in  mass  tort cases. 2  But,  as  I  will  explain  below,  these  individual
19.  See P.  SCHUCK,  supra note  9, at 269.
20.  See Robinson,  Probabilistic  Causation and Compensation  for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL
STuD.  779  (1986).
Class  actions  are  also  criticized  for  providing  disproportionately  greater  compensaton  to  less
severely  injured  victims  in comparison to  and at  the expense  of the  compensation  received  by
more  severely  injured  victims.  See P.  SCHUCK,  supra note 9, at 264.
21.  Cf. Scott, supra note  3.
22.  See Elliott,  Why  Courts? Comment on Robinson,  14  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  799,  803  (1985)
(opposing mass  tort  class  actions  because the "composition  of the  'risk portfolio'  is  unique for
each  individual  so  that ...  the common  issues of fact  [relating  to proof of causation]  do  not
predominate.").
23.  See generally G. CALABREsi,  Tim  CosTs OF AccmaDNTs (1970);  S. SirvELL,  TBm  EcoNomac
ANALYSiS  OF  TORT  LAW  (unpublished  manuscript);  Landes  &  Posner,  The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law,  15  GA.  L.  REv.  851  (1981).
24.  See  Calabresi,  Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43  U.  Cm.  L.  REv.  69  (1975);  Epstein,  Two  Fallacies  in the Law of Joint Torts, 73  GEo.
L.J.  1377  (1985).
*  25.  Generally,  rights-based  limits  would  be  reached  when,  as  measured  by  the  relevant
entitlements  baseline,  collectively averaged  treatment  redistributes  to  one class  of claimants  the
welfare of another class,  which receives no offsetting benefits.  Redistribution would not of itself
warrant affording  the disadvantaged  claimants  individually  particularized  treatment,  unless  the
process  of separate  actions  presented  a less  pronounced  danger of redistribution than  the  class
action.  As such,  process  is  merely an instrument  for doing distributional justice.  It is possible,
of course,  to conceive  of process  as having  intrinsic  participatory  value,  which should  then  be
[Vol.  62:561MASS  TORTS
justice  arguments  are  exaggerated.  They  ignore  not  only  the  realities  of
claimant  dependency  and  powerlessness  in individual  actions,  but they  also
fail to  recognize  the existence  of collectivizing  forces  operating in the mass
accident context,  particularly the class-wide nature of the risk ex ante,  which
exerts  a unifying  influence  over  the security  interests  (deterrence)  and  pro-
tective responses  (insurance) of the potential  accident  victims.  A major aim
of this paper is to demonstrate that,  given such ex ante conditions,  bureau-
cratic justice implemented through class actions provides better opportunities
for  achieving  individual  justice  than  does  the  tort  system's  private  law,
disaggregative  processes.
This paper  examines  the asserted  conflict between  the ideal  of individual
justice  and the  collective  processes  of class  actions.  Section  I  sketches  the
aggregative  and averaging  possibilities  afforded by class actions  in mass tort
cases,  and  outlines  the utilitarian  as  well  as  rights-based  justifications  for
their  relatively  non-controversial  use  in  overcoming  the  cost barriers  that
prevent  access  to  the  system.  It also  responds to  objections  raised  against
class actions  from these theoretical  perspectives.  Criticisms  of class actions,
and  the "public  law"  approaches  they exemplify,  as  inefficient methods  of
regulating  risk  are  shown  to be  substantially  overstated.  Rights-based  ob-
jections  will be  seen to  fail because  their  central assumption-the  equation
of individual trial outcomes  and  individual justice-is contingent  and prob-
lematic. Moreover, both sets of objections are largely based on an inadequate
understanding  of the  class  action mechanism.
Section  II  demonstrates  the  existence  of  important  intersections  in  the
mass  tort context  where the  ends  of individual  justice  are better  served  by
collective, rather than by disaggregative,  processes.  This will be true generally
when the substantive  liability or remedial  norm is collective in nature.26 But,
incorporated  in the entitlements  baseline.  See  MicheIman,  The  Supreme Court and Litigation
Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973  Dusz  L.J.  1153,  1193-97.  But,  it would
be incorrect  to equate  the participatory  value  with the notion of individual  control.  The parti-
cipatory  value  could just  as easily  be expressed  in terms of  the group solidarity  promoted by
the collective  processes of class  actions.
In any event, while  class actions are often criticized for denying individual control, the criticism
is usually  expressed  as an  instrumental  rather  than  ontological  argument.  That  is,  individual
control is respected not for its own sake, but as a means to such ends as the venting of emotions
to  ameliorate  alienation  and  the  potential  for  violence.  See Trangsrud,  supra note  6,  at 820
(emphasizing  the  "psychological  and emotional  importance  of individually  vindicating  [one's]
rights  against the responsible  parties"  in  cases of severe  personal  injury).  But even  if it  could
be  said that individual  control  should  be valued  for its  own sake,  and  should  be given greater
weight  than  group solidarity,  individual  control  is  not necessarily,  as I  explain  infra notes 78-
85  and accompanying  text,  precluded  by class  actions.
26.  Collective  normative  premises in tort  law  are  well  illustrated  by the justifications  con-
ventionally given for strict products liability.  See generally Calabresi, supra note 24. Using  strict
products  liability  to  achieve  optimal  deterrence  obviously  implies the  collective  norm  of maxi-
mizing  social  welfare.  To  the  extent that  consumers  lack  sufficient  information  to  gauge the
risks  latent  in  the  products  and  services  they  purchase,  the  threat  of  "strict"  manufacturer
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for  the  purposes  of  this  section,  governing  norms  are  assumed  to  possess
an individualistic content.
27  The explanation  for the harmonies  in individual
and  bureaucratic  justice rests  instead  on  a critique  of the  substantive  dis-
tortions  created  by  the  tort  system's  traditional  private  law  process.  The
disaggregative,  linearly  retrospective  character  of this  process  leads  courts
to ignore the  ex ante effects  of accident  risks  on the  rights and  lives  of the
at-risk population.  Because  these risks are  frequently indivisibly experienced
class-wide,  their pre-accident effects on the at-risk population will be uniform
and average  in nature. In these situations,  unless the due care liability norm2
and  the  make  whole  remedial  norm 29  are  applied  on  an  aggregate  and
averaged  basis,  the distributional  fairness implicit in the notion of individual
justice  will  be thwarted.
I.  AGGREGATION  AND  AVERAGING  OF  CLAIMS  IN  A  MASS  TORT
CLASS  ACTION
Opposition  to aggregation  and  averaging  in  mass  tort class  actions  is  in
fact largely anticipatory.  In the relatively  few  class actions which have been
certified, the scope of collective adjudication has been narrowly circumscribed
to  preserve  party  control  and  the  opportunity  for  individualized  determi-
nations of noncommon  liability and damage questions.30  Most of the public
liability  (with appropriate  defenses of product  misuse and contributory  negligence)  may  serve to
maximize social welfare  not only by inducing  due care in the production  and marketing  of these
goods but  also  by  achieving  the efficient  levels of consumption  and  of consequent  hazard.  See
S.  SHAVELL,  supra note  23.  Similarly,  the  loss  spreading justification  of strict  products  liability
implements  social justice  by  pooling risks.  Strict liability  simultaneously  relieves  the injured  of
concentrated  loss  and  distributes  that burden  in  relatively  small portions  to  those  who  have
benefited from the product or  service.  See K.  ABRAHAM,  DIsTgnBu'NGG  RISK:  INSURANCE,  LEGAL
THEoRY,  AND  PUBLIc  POLICY  26  (1986);  cf. ARIsToTLE,  NIcHoMAcHEAN  ETmcs V.5.II32b-.II34a
(W.  Ross  trans.  1926);  Dworkin,  What Is Equality? Part  2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHiL.  &
Pm. Ass.  283  (1981).  For enlightening elaboration and  critique  of strict product  liability schol-
arship,  see  Priest,  The Invention of Enterprise  Liability: A  Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations  of Modern Tort Law,  14  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  461  (1985).
27.  It is  also  assumed,  for  purposes  of this  section  that  there  are  no significant  cost  and
information  barriers  preventing  resort  to separate  actions  for mass  tort claims.
28.  The  "due  care"  reference  is  meant  to  encompass  rights-based  notions  of negligence,
under which  liability requires  a finding that the defendant  was  at fault or acted wrongfully.  See
Posner, supra note  8;  Schwartz,  New Products, Old Products,  Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58  N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  796  (1983).
29.  The "make  whole" reference  incorporates the notion of tort damages as generally seeking
to restore plaintiffs to the  distributional position they would have  occupied  had the accident  not
occurred.  See East River Steamship  Corp.  v.  Transamerica  Delaval  Inc.,  106 S. Ct.  2295  & n.9
(1986);  Prosser,  The Borderland  Between  Tort and Contract, in  SELECTED Topics  ON  THE  LAW
OF  TORTS  380,  424-27  (Thomas M.  Cooley Lectures,  Fourth Series  1953).
30.  See,  e.g.,  Payton v.  Abbott  Laboratories,  83  F.R.D.  382  (D.  Mass.  1979)  (conditional
order granting class certificatoin),  vacated, 100 F.R.D.  336  (D.  Mass.  1983) (class  action decer-
tified); In re "Agent  Orange"  Prod.  Liab.  Litig.,  100  F.R.D. 718  (E.D.N.Y.  1983)  (certifying
plaintiff  class  action),  vacated, 611  F. Supp.  1221  (E.D.N.Y.  1985)  (granting  manufacturers'
motion for summary judgment against opt-out plaintiffs on grounds of failure to establish causation
and  to  overcome  government  contract  defense).
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law procedures  which might be used in mass accident class actions-especially
aggregating  claims on a mandatory  basis and  averaging  causation  and  dam-
ages-have  been employed  only in  settlements,  and never  by coercive  court
order.3'  Indeed,  even when  mass  tort  class  actions  have been  certified  for
trial, the collective process is entirely elective since class members  are entitled
to opt out  in  favor of individual  actions.12 Class  treatment,  moreover,  has
been  extended  solely  to the  common  questions  of law  and  fact  concerning
liability,  preserving  the  right  to  an  individual  trial  on  damages. 33 In  some
cases  courts  have  gone slightly  beyond the  conventional  bifurcation  of lia-
bility and  damage  elements  of the tort cause  of action.  They have  instead
designated  certain  common  liability  issues  for  class  treatment,  while  re-
manding  the  remaining  liability  questions  relating  to the  circumstances  of
each class member to an individual trial before, or along with,  determination
of damages.
34
A.  Potential  Applications of Public Law Process: Mandatory
Class Actions and Damage Scheduling
Although  contemporary  class  action  practice  generally  respects  the prin-
ciples of individual justice by  maintaining voluntary  participation,  critics  of
the procedure  correctly recognize its potential to develop in more innovative
public  law  directions. 3 5  Mandatory  class  actions  combined  with  damage
scheduling  are  two  changes  in  current  practice  that  would  have  the  most
important  applications to mass torts,  especially those involving  long-latency
disease  risks  from toxic  substance  exposure.36 Class actions  would be  man-
31.  See, e.g.,  In re "Agent  Orange"  Prod. Liab.  Litig.,  597 F. Supp.  740 (E.D.N.Y.  1984).
For a  description of the Agent Orange settlement,  see P.  ScHUCK;  supra note 9,  at  143.
32.  FED.  R.  Civ.  P.  23(b)(3)  guarantees absentees  the right to opt out of the class action in
favor of separate  actions  on all issues,  common as well  as individual.  The  "opt-out  right"  may
now have  received constitutional  status,  at least  in state  class  actions asserting  extra-territorial
jurisdiction  over  absentees.  See Phillips  Petroleum Co.  v. Shutts,  105  S.  Ct.  2695  (1985);  Miller
& Crump,  supra note  15,  at  52.
Certification  of "mandatory"  class  actions  pursuant  to  FED.  R.  Crv.  P.  23(b)(1)  or  (b)(2),
under which  there is  no  opt-out right,  have been  consistently  denied.  See, e.g.,  In re Asbestos
School Litig.,  104  F.R.D.  422 (E.D. Pa.  1984),  aff'd in part, vacated in part, 789 F.2d 986 (3d
Cir.  1985),  vacated, 791 F.2d 920 (3d Cir.  1986); In re Northern Dist.  of Cal.  "Dalkon  Shield"
IUD Prods.  Liab.  Litig.,  526 F. Supp.  887  (N.D.  Cal.  1981),  rev'd and vacated, 693 F.2d  847
(9th Cir.  1982);  McDonnell  Douglas Corp.  v.  United  States Dist.  Ct.,  523  F.2d  1083  (9th Cir.
1975),  cert. denied, 425 U.S.  911  (1976).
33.  See, e.g.,  Payton, 83  F.R.D. 382.  Bifurcation  for class-wide  resolution  of liability  ques-
tions  and  individualization  of damages  is  endorsed by  FED.  R.  Crv. P.  23(c)(4),  1966  advisory
committee  note. See generally 7B  C.  WRIGHT,  A.  MILLER  & M.  KANE,  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  Ai
PROCEDURE  § 1790  (2d ed.  1986).
34.  See, e.g.,  In re Bendectin Prods.  Liab.  Litig.,  749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.  1984); In re Beverly
Hills  Fire Litig.,  695  F.2d  207  (6th Cir.  1982),  cert. denied, 461  U.S.  929  (1983);  Payton, 83
F.R.D.  382.
35.  See,  e.g.,  P.  ScmrucK,  supra note 9;  Trangsrud,  supra note  6.
36.  See  generally Rosenberg,  supra note  7, at 905.
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datory both in the  sense that  (i)  courts  could  act  on their  own  initiative  to
certify pending and future mass tort claims for class treatment,  and  (ii) there
would be no opportunity to opt out in order to  prosecute  a separate action
on the issues  common  to all  claims  as  well  as  the issues  specific to  each. 7
To  achieve  even  greater  efficiencies  in  the  process,  courts  would  impose
damage schedules  based on the average  loss suffered  by members of relevant
subclasses  or  even by the  class  as  a whole.3"
The  choice  of  disaggregative  over  collective  adjudication  for  mass  tort
accidents  has  profound  consequences  for  the  parties  as  well  as  the  tort
system's  compensation  and  deterrence  objectives.  The  costs  of traditional
disaggregative,  private law  processes exclude  many claims  from the system.
The  cost  barriers  are  compounded  by  other  prevalent  conditions,  such  as
the low income status of a significant number of the victims,  and the relatively
low probability of success at trial that characterizes  these legally and factually
complex cases.  In addition, to the extent that courts begin to use proportional
liability to resolve the causation issues that routinely arise in toxic tort cases,
the  costs  of disaggregative process  are magnified  in the  evaluation of these
claims by plaintiff attorneys.  Many of these claims are rendered unmarketable
to competent  plaintiff  attorneys because  the returns on their contingent  fee
investment,  which  are likely to be  marginally competitive  to  begin with  for
the  reasons noted  above,  are  discounted  in proportion to the probability  of
causation in each  case.39 As a result, many victims not only are denied access
to  the  system  and  receive  no  compensation,  but  the  deterrent  effects  of
threatened  liability  are significantly  reduced.
In  addition,  the  case-by-case,  individualized  processing  of the  mass  tort
claims  that  are  filed  confers  a  strategic  edge  upon  defendant  firms.  While
37.  As discussed  infra note  92,  the mandatory  nature of the  class  action might be  relaxed
in  certain  cases to  allow  individual  trials  on  damages.  In  that  event,  however,  the  individual
trials would be conducted  not in separate actions, but under the auspices and supervisory authority
of the class  action.
38.  Recent  advances  in  epidemological  and related  methodologies  have  made  such  damage
scheduling  feasible.  See Lagakos  & Mosteller,  Assigned Shares in Compensation for Radiation-
Related Cancers, 6  RIsK  ANAYsis  345  (1986).  This  paper  reports  on the  development  by  the
National  Institutes  of Health of radioepidemiologic  tables  pursuant to congressional mandate  in
Pub.  L.  No.  97-414,  § 7,  96  Stat.  2049  (1983)  (Jan.  4,  1983),  appended  to the  Orphan  Drug
Act, 42 U.S.C. §  241 (1985).  These tables are designed to facilitate the use of causally proportioned
liability  in the  trial of damage  claims  arising  from  atomic  bomb  tests in the  western  states  as
well  as  from  other accidents  involving  radiation  exposure.  The  tables go  beyond  the undiffer-
entiated  form of proportional  liability-which would apportion damages according to the average
probability  of causation  for  the exposed  population  as a  whole.  Representing  state-of-the-art
epediological  analysis,  the tables prescribe  formulas for partitioning  the  exposed  population into
a  hierarchy  of subgroups  or reference  sets,  and  for assigning to each  a value derived  from  the
set's fractional  share of the  aggregate excess disease incidence  in the  population as a whole.  For
a critical  commentary  on the tables'  effort to enable proportional liability  at the subgroup level,
see Rosenberg,  The Uncertainties  of  Assigned Shares Tort Compensation: What  We Don't Know
Can Hurt Us, 6 RISK  ANALYsis  363  (1986).
39.  See Rosenberg,  supra note 7,  at 894.
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it  prevents  victims  from  deriving the  benefits  of concerted  action,  the tra-
ditional  process  has no  similar effect  on the  capacity of defendant  firms to
spread  litigation  costs  and  prepare  the  common  questions  efficiently  on  a
once-and-for-all  basis. Most liability issues will be substantially the same  for
all claims arising from a given mass accident, and thus defendants can always
aggregate  claims  to  exploit  (at times  quite  abusively)  the  efficiencies  of a
virtual class action.40 Because of their cost-spreading advantages,  a defendant
firm typically  can afford  not only  to invest  more in  developing the  merits
of the claim than the opposing plaintiff attorney, but also to finance  a "war
of attrition"  through costly discovery  and motion practice  that depletes  the
adversary's  litigation resources. 41 The consequences  of redundantly  litigating
common  questions  thus  skews  the  presentation  of  the  merits,  promotes
abusive  strategic  use  of  procedure,  needlessly  consumes  public  resources,
and ultimately drains away a large amount of the funds available to redress,
by judgment or  settlement,  victim  losses.
While  defendant  firms  enjoy  litigation  cost  advantages  because  of  the
system's traditional disaggregative  processes, the most consistently successful
beneficiaries  of case-by-case  adjudication  are the lawyers-both  for defend-
ants and plaintiffs.42 A major factor in the escalating costs  of the tort system
is  attorney  fees,  against  which  there  are  no  presently  effective  market  or
regulatory  controls.  Defense  lawyers -contribute to the  dismal  ratio  of liti-
gation  costs  to  net compensation  in mass tort  litigation by  exploiting their
hourly  fee  arrangements.  Under  such  arrangements  defense  lawyers  have
every  incentive  to  make  work  for themselves,  particularly  by grossly  over-
staffing  multi-defendant  cases,  and  by  resisting  any  collective  process  re-
placement for case-by-case  adjudication.  Although their clients gain to some
degree  from these  practices,  because  they  translate into increased  litigation
expense  for  plaintiffs,  the  costs  inflicted  on  the  public-in terms  of  the
needless consumption of attorney and judicial resources-by defense attorney
avarice  are unmitigated.  For similar  reasons,  plaintiff attorneys,  too, prefer
disaggregative  process.  Class treatment of mass tort claims  from a particular
accident  requires  only a  fraction  of tie legal  services  provided  by plaintiff
attorneys  compared  to  case-by-case  adjudication,  which  disperses  claims
widely over territory and time.41 That  courts have  the power in class  actions
40.  See id. at 902.
To be sure, plaintiff attorneys are "repeat  players"  who can hedge against the risks of litigation
by diversifying their  portfolio of cases.  But  such  diversification  is  unlikely  to  enable attorneys
to offset the concentrated  risks of multiple  mass tort claims.  This is because  expertise developed
in litigating the mass tort claims  will  have only the most general application in the vast bulk of
the  cases comprising the attorney's  portfolio.
41.  See Rosenberg,  supra note  12,  at 1705.
42.  See generally Rosenberg,  supra note  12;  Coffee, supra note  15,  at 247.
43.  The  dimensions  of plaintiff attorney  stakes  and interests  in  preserving  separate  actions
are  indicated by the  billion  dollars in contingency  fees  guaranteed  plaintiff  attorneys  in order
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to  review  class  settlements  and  to  determine  class  attorney  fees  helps  to
explain  plaintiff attorney  aversion  to  collective  process."
Class  treatment  of these  claims  would  produce  radically different  results
from those generated by traditional case-by-case  adjudication.41  Class  action
aggregation  would  very  likely  make  the  low  value  claims  marketable  to
competent  plaintiff  attorneys,  and  therefore  firms  would  be  faced  with
liability  for  a  much  larger  percentage  of the  compensable  losses  resulting
from mass tort accidents.  If mandatory class actions were convened by courts
on their  own initiative,  the  unnecessary  costs  of redundantly  litigating the
common questions  presented  in marketable mass tort claims  would be elim-
inated. In addition, mandatory certification  would substantially  diminish the
incentives of defendants to exploit their cost advantages in individual actions,
and  would  negate  the  motivation  of  and  eliminate  the  costly  efforts  by
plaintiff  and  defense  attorneys  to  oppose  class  actions  in  order  to  protect
their  fees  rather than  their  clients'  interests.  The  savings  in  administrative
expense would  substantially increase  the proportion  of the awards  recovered
by victims  as  compensation.
Damage scheduling  could be used to further reduce litigation costs entailed
by the individualized  determination  of damages.
6  Such  a procedure  would
greatly increase  access  for low value claims.47  Because  scheduling  eliminates
much  of the  need  for customized  legal  services,  thus  yielding  even  greater
returns  in  compensation  on relatively  high  value  claims  than  would  indivi-
dualized  determinations,  it should not be used exclusively  in low value class
actions.  Regardless  of the  value of the  claims  involved,  the most  dramatic
cost  savings  could  be  achieved  if the  schedule  provided  compensation  ac-
cording  to  the  average  income  loss  and  probability  of  causation  for  the
population  as  a whole. Victims with  above average  losses or exposure might
to  gain  their support for  including  future claims in the Manville reorganization  plan. See N.Y.
Times,  Feb.  17,  1986,  at Dl,  col.  3. It did not  phase  these attorneys  that exclusion  of future
claims would very likely prevent reorganization  and thus the firm's capacity to generate sufficient
income  to compensate  future victims  of asbestos-related  disease.
44.  See Far. R.  Civ.  P.  23(e); In re "Agent  Orange"  Prod.  Liab.  Litig.,  597  F. Supp.  740
(approving settlement  of class  action);  In re "Agent  Orange"  Prod.  Liab.  Litig.,  611  F. Supp.
1296  (E.D.N.Y.  1985)  (awarding  attorney's  fees  in class  action).
45.  See generally Rosenberg,  supra note  7.
46.  See Rosenberg,  supra note 7,  at 917-19.
47.  Damage  scheduling  is  preferable  to  increasing  fee  awards  as  a  means  of encouraging
plaintiff attorneys  to accept  small  claim  class  actions.  Increased  fee awards may  all  but defeat
the compensation  goal  by transferring  most of the recovery  to  the class  attorney.  Dam,  supra
note  17,  at 52. Cf. Eisen v.  Carlisle & Jacquelin,  391  F.2d  555,  567  (2d Cir.  1968),  vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S.  156 (1974)  (expressing  "reluctan[ce]  to permit actions to proceed  where they
are  not  likely  to  benefit anyone  but  the lawyers  who  bring  them").  From the  perspective  of
deterrence,  moreover,  increased  attorney  fees  may create  an  excessive  incentive .to bring  suit.
See Shavell,  The Social Versus the Private  Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System,  11
J.  LaoAL STu.  333  (1982).
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well  find that their treatment  at  a statistical  average  was more than  offset
by the  savings  in litigation  costs,  including  attorney  fees.4 8
B.  Utilitarian  Deterrence and Bureaucratic  Justice
The prevailing utilitarian justification for tort liability is  to create optimal
incentives for accident avoidance.49 Accordingly, the threat of liability should
induce  firms  engaged  in  risky  activities  to  take  due  or  optimal  care  by
investing in  safety precautions  against  accidents  so  long  as the injury  loss
avoided  exceeds,  at the  margin, the expenditures  on prevention.  Threatened
tort liability  also may  advance  deterrence  objectives  by compelling  firms to
internalize  the  residual  injury  loss-loss  which  is  unavoidable  by  optimal
care-thereby  inducing  moderation  of their levels  of activity  and  the  cor-
responding levels of accident risk.50 When administrative  expenses5' are taken
into account,  the calculus  becomes the  extremely  complicated  one  of max-
imizing the system's functional productivity in terms of the net benefits from
tort liability deterrence.
2
Public  law processes  promote  this  social welfare  maximizing  function  of
tort liability in all phases,  both by providing incentives to take optimal care
and  to moderate  activity  levels,  and  by  achieving  sharp  reductions  in  ad-
ministrative  costs.  By  making  relatively  low  value  claims  marketable  to
competent  plaintiff attorneys,  class  actions  bolster  the  deterrent  effect  of
threatened  tort  liability.  Absent  class  action  treatment,  the  bulk  of  these
claims would be excluded from the system, reducing both the firm's incentives
to take  precautions  and  its  internalization  of residual  accident  costs.  The
potential  for  administrative  cost  savings  is  very  high  as  well.  Mandatory
class  actions  would  radically  reduce  the consumption  of party  and  public
resources  for  redundant,  case-by-case  adjudication.  It  would  also  substan-
tially diminish the cost advantage conferred on defendant firms by the private
law,  disaggregative  process-which  in  reality is  disaggregative  only on  the
plaintiff  side.  Damage  scheduling  to  replace  individualized  causation  and
injury loss determinations  would not only increase the marketability of very
low value claims, but also would increase the efficiency of the process overall.
48.  Section II  demonstrates  that even  in the absence  of such  offsetting  benefits,  aggregate
and averaging  treatment  may not  only be reconcilable  with  principles  of individual  justice,  but
will in a significant number of situations  better effectuate those principles than the disaggregative
process of separate  trials to individualize  liability and damages.
49.  See generally S.  SHAVELL,  supra note 23.
50.  See Shavell,  Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL  STUD.  1, 24-25  (1980).
51.  These are the public and private costs incurred by the courts and the parties in determining
the factual  basis of claims, in interpreting  and applying the governing  rules,  and in conforming
behavior  and practices  to  such rules.
52.  For a general  discussion of net benefit policy  analysis,  see E.  STOKEY & R. ZacKHAUSER,
A  Pamm-  FOR PoucY  ANALYSIS  134 (1978).
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Utilitarian  criticism of the public  law approach  has been  launched  along
two fronts.  Specifically,  the  approach  is attacked  for  its potential to induce
an  influx  of low value  mass  tort claims  that  will  displace  previously  mar-
ketable,  higher value sporadic  claims from the system." 5  More generally,  the
objection  is  that  because  of  the  system's  inherent  biases  and  other  short-
comings,  tort  liability  already  stifles  and overdeters  productive  activity,  es-
pecially  involving  the  development  and  marketing  of new  technology,  and
the  public  law  approach  can  only  exacerbate  the  problem.
5 4  A  complete
assessment of these  objections  is beyond  the scope of this paper,  but as  will
become  apparent in the discussion below,  both suffer  from readily  apparent
errors  in  reasoning,  compounded,  in the  case  of the second  objection,  by
rather  implausible,  unsupported  assumptions.
1.  The Displacement  Argument  and  Plaintiff Attorney
Gatekeepers
The  displacement  argument  predicts  that  by  aggregating  relatively  low
value  mass  tort claims  in  a class  action,  tort  system  resources  will  be mo-
nopolized  by an  endless  and  costly stream of individual  damage  trials  that
will  undermine  the  system's  functional  productivity  by  excluding  relatively
higher  value  sporadic  claims s .
5   There  is,  however,  little  substance  to  this
position.  First,  assuming  that  claims  which  are  cost-effective  for  plaintiff
attorneys  to  prosecute  are  cost-effective  for  the  system  to process, 56  then
displacement  is unlikely to occur at all.  Unless the expected  return from the
classed  mass tort claims,  net of the costs  of litigating the common questions
and  the individual  questions  in a series  of individual  damage  trials,  exceeds
the return expected from competing sporadic claims, plaintiff attorneys would
admit the sporadic and  exclude the mass tort claims from the system. Func-
tioning  as  gatekeepers,  plaintiff  attorneys  are  thus  likely  to  select  among
competing  claims,  sporadic  or mass tort,  those  which  are the  most admin-
istratively  efficient  for the  system to process.
53.  See Dam, supra note  17,  at 52-53.
54.  See Huber,  Safety and the  Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the  Courts, 85  CoLUM.  L.  REv.  277  (1985).
55.  This reason  for  denying mass  tort class  actions is implied  by  the statement  in the  1966
advisory  committee  note to Rule  23  that  "[a]  'mass  accident'  . . . is  ordinarily not appropriate
for a class action because  [given the individual  questions of liability as well as damages].  . . an
action conducted  nominally  as a class action would degenerate  in practice  into multiple lawsuits
separately  tried."  FED.  R.  Crv.  P.  23,  advisory  committee note,  reprinted  in 39 F.R.D.  69,  103
(1966).
56.  It is  certainly plausible to  assume a  high degree of correspondence  between  private  and
public burden entailed by the complex legal and factual questions which toxic tort claims typically
present.  See McGovern,  Toward a Functional  Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53
U.  C.  L.  Ray.  440,  478  (1986);  Rubin,  supra note  10;  D.  HENSLER,  supra note  14.
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Second,  the displacement argument assumes sporadic and mass tort claims
are  fungible  in  terms  of  deterrence  objectives.  Because  of  the  distinctive
nature  of sporadic  and  mass  tort  accidents,  this  assumption  is  untenable.
For many reasons arising from the business policy origins of mass accidents-
the centralized,  deliberate  calculations  of private  costs  and  benefits-firms
that create such risks are amenable to the regulatory  pressures from credible
threats of tort  liability.  In  contrast,  the fact  that  many sporadic  accidents
result  from  individual,  human  misjudgments,  lapses  of attention,  and  im-
pulsiveness  suggest that tort  liability may  have  little  or  no  deterrent  effect
in such situations.  Thus, measured  by the deterrence  objectives, the system's
functional  effectiveness  will  be  increased  even  if  mass  tort  class  actions
displace  sporadic claims.
Third,  the  possibility  of  displacement  can  be  minimized  by  employing
damage scheduling  to  eliminate  all individual  damage trials.  This is  because
the goal of deterrence, in  a system  governed  by utilitarian principles can be
achieved  by holding the defendant  firm  liable for the  aggregate loss that its
tortious  conduct  caused,  regardless  of  whether  and how  damages  are  dis-
tributed among plaintiffs.  Although  compensation  is not a primary  concern
when  deterrence  is  the  objective,  it  is  nevertheless  appropriate  to note  that
claimants  who  would  otherwise have been  priced  out of the system  by the
costs  of individual  damage  trials  would  doubtless  prefer  even  this  extreme
form of bureaucratic justice-damage scheduling-to  no justice at all.  More-
over,  it  is  likely that  those who  have suffered  above  average  losses,  albeit
of relatively  low  value,  also  would  benefit  from  increased  use of damage
scheduling,  even  to  the  point  of  distributing  recovery  on  an  equal  shares
basis.  The  overall  cost-savings  generated  by  the  aggregative  treatment  of
common  questions  and  by the elimination  of individual  damage  trials  may
more  than  compensate  these  claimants  for  any  difference  between  actual
losses suffered  and  the average  loss for which  they are reimbursed.
2.  The Overdeterrence  Argument  and Marginal  Utility Analysis
The  overdeterrence  argument  is  premised  on the  assumption  that  despite
its  risks,  the net  benefits  of new  technology  (e.g.,  nuclear  power)  exceed
those  of the  old  technology,  (e.g.,  fossil  fuel  generators,  fireplaces,  wool
sweaters) it replaces.57  According  to this argument, the tort system-even in
its inefficient private  law mode,  but certainly when its potency  is  enhanced
by public law processes-overdeters  firms that produce such new technology
in two ways.  First, the system  imposes the  full social  costs of the risk from
57.  See Huber, supra note 54, at 288,  295-99. This presumption is accepted  for the sake of
analysis,  but the claim  is most certainly debatable,  especially  when asserted as a generalization.
For  advocacy  of a more  cautious  stance  towards  new  technology,  see,  e.g.,  Krier  & Gillette,
The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism,  84 MicH.  L.  REv.  405  (1985).
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new technology  on its  producers  even  though  they  cannot  capture  its  full
social benefits.1
8  Second,  the system is  so biased  against the risks  from new
technology that it blatantly ignores  and hence perversely prefers  the greater
risks  of old  technology. 9 Both propositions  have  serious logical  flaws,  and
can  be salvaged  only by making dubious  factual  assumptions.
The  flaw in the first  claim is  its failure to recognize  that while firms may
not  fully  capture  the social  benefits  of new  technology-in  effect,  creating
a consumer  surplus-tort  liability for the  social costs  can be absorbed  into
the product  or service price without undermining efficient  consumption. To
the extent that  demand  decreases,  it will  reflect the choice  of consumers  at
the cost-benefit  margin.
Although  the  uncaptured  social  benefits  argument  can  be  stated  more
'broadly  than a claim of consumer surplus,  its analytical  defect remains.  The
argument as broadened asserts that the product or service price is insufficient
to incorporate  the  social  benefits  of new  technology  because  they  are  not
confined  to  direct  consumers,  but  are  enjoyed  indirectly  by  others  and by
society collectively.  The proposition  that the benefits of new technology  are
not  limited  to  direct  consumers  is  undeniable,  but  it  does  not  prove  that
tort liability will overdeter. The  conclusion fails simply because it is founded
on a wholly unsupportable premise:  that tort liability internalizes to defend-
ant  firms  the  full measure  of the  social  costs  from  new  technology.  Tort
liability  comes  nowhere  near  achieving  such  an  all  encompassing  degree  of
social cost internalization.  Many of the losses suffered by victims are legally
immaterial;60  deemed too  remote,6'  involve irreplaceable  goods, 2 or are un-
derstated because they lack a market referent. 6 3 Moreover, the adverse effects
58.  See Huber,  supra note  54,  at 291-92.
59.  See id. at  309-11.
60.  Examples include consequential  damages,  such as a child's loss of parental love, guidance
and companionship:  see, e.g.,  Steiner v. Bell Telephone,  55 U.S.L.W. 2311 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov.
18,  1986); mental distress over  future injury: see, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories,  386 Mass.
540,  437 N.E.2d  171  (1982);  a  family member's  injury which  the claimant did not witness  first
hand: see, e.g.,  Mazzagatti  v.  Everingham,  516  A.2d 672 (Pa.  1986).
61.  The  doctrine  of proximate  cause  traditionally  has  been  applied  in  a  broad  if ad  hoc
manner  to constrain the scope of tort liability from reaching  sources of risk and from redressing
injurious  consequences  which are  considered  too  atenuated  or conjectural  even if causally  con-
nected  to  the accident.  See  generally P.  KEETON,  D.  DOaBS,  R.  KEETON,  D.  OWEN,  PROSSER
AND  KEETON  ON  TORTS  264  (1984).
62.  It is  doubtful  that tort liability can  ever provide anything  resembling full compensation
for  serious  injuries  let  alone  loss of life.  See generally Mishan,  Evaluation of Life and Limb:
A  Theoretical  Approach, 79  J.  PoL.  EcoN.  687  (1971)  (criticizing various  methods  of valuing
the loss of life).
63.  Examples  include  the  costs  imposed  on  future  generations  from  environmental  degra-
dation,  the losses  of life in the case of the very young  and very  old  whose social value  can  not
be calculated  by labor market measures,  or  the bearing  of risks for which there is no  insurance
market.  See generally E.  STottin  & R.  ZEcKHurusER,  supra note  52,  at  299-301.
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of accidents  on third parties  and  the  community  generally  and  collectively
are not recoverable 4
The argument of uncaptured  social benefits  also fails because it completely
ignores  that  to  the  extent  a  social  surplus  exists,  potential  overdeterrence
can be  ameliorated  through  a social  decision  by informed  public  represen-
tatives  to  "subsidize"  the  new technology,  or,  at  least,  a  particular  appli-
cation  of it.  The  "subsidy"  is  merely  a  tax  on  the  non-consumer,  public
beneficiaries  of the technology.  Our nation has a long tradition of subsidizing
new  technologies,  often  on  a  targeted  basis, 6 5  and  more  indiscriminately
through  tax  incentives  and  indirect  public  investments,  such  as  new  roads
and higher education.  By compelling public authorities to confront the social
costs  of new  technology,  tort liability  merely  creates  pressures  for  the  po-
litically  representative  branches  to  make  a  deliberate,  precise,  and  overt
decision  whether  the  expected  social  benefits  from  a  particular  new  tech-
nology  are  sufficiently  great  to warrant  a commitment  of social  resources
to  promote  its  development  and  deployment.  It  also  focuses  the  attention
of public  authorities  on the distributional  effects  of the  choice to subsidize
a new technological venture and the means  selected to accomplish that end. 6
The broad  social and narrower  consumer  surplus claims  should  also both
be  rejected  because  they  rest on the  fundamentally  erroneous  premise that
activities  deserve  an exemption  from tort liability merely  because  they gen-
64.  See generally Duke  Power Co. v.  Carolina Envtl. Study Group,  Inc.,  438  U.S. 59  (1978);
Kennedy,  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A  Critique, 33  STAN.  L.  REv.  387
(1981).
65.  See M. HoRwrrz,  Tim  TRANSFORMATION  OF  AmmucAN  LAW  31-108  (1977);  see also, e.g.,
The Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982)  (encouraging development of the atomic energy
industry  by imposing  a ceiling  on tort liability  damages  for a  single nuclear  accident).
66.  Tort liability may not be the most accurate  and efficient cost-accounting  method,  but it
has  the  virtues  of being  largely  impervious  to  political  and  economic  pressures  to  ignore  the
questions  of risk and  loss  bearing.  In any  event, the tort system is  likely to play no  more than
a backstop  role,  since  the prospect of liability should induce intervention  by  public authorities
before  the new  technology  is marketed or becomes  operative.  Rather than the  dismay expressed
by some commentators,  see, e.g., Huber,  supra note 54, the fact  that firms are now publicly
seeking  government support  before  they  market  products  with  substantial  or  unknown  health
risks  should  be  regarded  as  a  healthy  sign  of  public  participation  and  accountability  in  the
subsidy  policy-making  process.
In  light  of the possibilities  for public  subsidies,  the crisis tone of some  tort system  criticism
seems  premature  at best.  Implicitly,  such  criticism  reflects  distrust  of the political  process  for
deciding  the  fate of  new  technologies.  By  seeking  to  curtail  the tort  system's  effectiveness  in
regulating  risk, new  technology  advocates appear to be following a strategy  of seeking  de facto
preference  for  such  technology  without  an  open  hearing  and  assessment  on  its  merits  in the
democratic  political  process.  Ironically,  this  strategy  mirrors  the tactics  and  motives  of  some
tort system supporters,  who believe the tort and other common-law  systems are prone to excesses
and manipulation in favor of the poor, workers,  and  other economically disadvantaged  groups.
Tort claims  provide  the means for modern-day  Robin Hoods to perpetrate  hit-and-run  raids on
corporate deep pockets.  These tort system supporters  share with the system's detractors a distrust
of the political process,  the only difference being  the supporters'  conviction that the bias  favors
new  technology over  the distributional  interests of the disadvantaged.
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erate  more benefits  than costs.  While total benefits  exceed  costs,  there may
still  be  room  for  incremental  or  marginal  improvements.  The  uncaptured
social  benefit  argument  simplistically  ignores  the  role  of  tort  liability-
whether  enforced under a negligence  or strict standard-in reducing accident
costs  at the margins. 67
The  claim that immunity from tort liability ought to be conferred on new
technology  when its net benefits exceed those of the old technology can  only
be  revived  by  assuming  that  consumers  grossly  and  systematically  under-
estimate  the  risks  of  old  technology.6 8  If  this  were  the  case,  then  price
increases  induced  by tort  liability imposed  on  new technology  would  drive
consumers  to old,  riskier  substitutes.  This argument  falls,  however,  because
of its  implicit  assumption  that  the  old  technological  alternative  for  some
reason  is  exempt from tort liability.  Outside of the relatively rare situation
where  a consumer might  choose  to let  nature take its  course-for  example,
by rejecting a prescription drug which has significant side effects but promises
an offsetting  chance of recovery-the  assumption  appears  to  have  little  in
common  with reality.  Most old technologies  of human design are subject to
tort  liability  just  like  the  new. 69  Their  costs  therefore  will  reflect  risk  as-
sessments just as  in the case  of new technology.7 0
The  second claim-that courts systematically  ignore the risks  of old tech-
nology  and,  in  any  event,  lack the  expertise  to impose  liability  discrimin-
atingly-is  founded  entirely  on implausible  and  cramped  assumptions.  Cer-
tainly there is no dearth of doctrine mandating judicial scrutiny of the relative
67.  See generally Landes  & Posner, supra note 23.
Tort  liability  also  represents  a less  costly means  of controlling risk than  conventional  forms
of administrative  regulation,  which entail  the  expense  of continuous  surveillance  and  command
and  control  adjustments.  For  an analytical  framework  for  comparatively  assessing  the  effec-
tiveness  of tort  and administrative  methods of controlling  risk,  see Shavell,  Liability for Harm
Versus Regulation of Safety,  13  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  357  (1984).
68.  See Huber, supra note 54, at 315-20 (presuming that consumers  are unaware of the risk
differential  between new and old technology,  and, more expansively,  that risk is not a significant
factor  in private consumption  decisions).
69.  Even while he decries the fate of new technology at the hands of the tort system,  Huber
acknowledges that tort liability has been effective in providing appropriate risk reducing incentives
for  producers  of old  technology.  See Huber,  supra note  54,  at  331.
In addition,  the assumption  about consumer  ignorance and indifference is unrealistic in failing
to  appreciate  the incentives  producers of new  technologies  have  to  educate the  public through
advertising  and otherwise  to the comparative  advantages  of the new over the old. Furthermore,
in  many instances  where  new  and  old technology  compete,  intermediaries  such  as physicians,
insurance and other financial institutions, and public agencies are available and in many situations
affirmatively  responsible  for  apprising consumers  of the relative  risks  involved and,  should  the
need  arise,  for  correcting  irrational  decisions.
70.  Even if  old technology  were  to  receive  a preference,  which  seems  implausible,  and  in
any  event  is  an  empirical  question,  it  would  not  necessarily  inhibit  development  of  socially
beneficial  technologies.  Rather,  the investment decision  would be made  on  the expectation  that
should  a given  new  technology  prove  beneficial,  it  would  gain  the  arguably  sheltered  position
of an  "old"  technology.
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risks  and  expected  benefits  from  competing  technologies.
7 1  The  claim  of
judicial indifference  to the financial burden of liability on producers  of new
and  socially  beneficial  technology  is  refuted  by the  virtually  universal  ad-
herence  to  the  unavoidably  unsafe  constraint  on tort  liability  propounded
by  Comment  k  to  section  402A  of the  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts. 7 2
Defendant  firms,  moreover,  have strong motivations to prevent any judicial
lapse  of attention  in  this regard. 7 3  Finally,  lack  of expertise  and other  de-
ficiencies in the tort system  can be corrected through "public  law"  reforms,
such  as the use of blue ribbon juries  assisted by court-appointed  experts  to
determine  technical,  medical  and  other scientific  issues. 74
C.  Rights-Based Compensation and Bureaucratic  Justice
Rights-based justifications  for tort liability are concerned with the fairness
of the  distributional  consequences  of  an  accident  for  the  individuals  in-
71.  The  law  is  replete with  such  mandates,  which  over  time  have been  expressed  in more
sophisticated  doctrinal  formulations.  It is  enough  for  these purposes to note the multi-factored
analysis  of benefits  versus costs  mandated  for  cases  involving  ultrahazardous  and  abnormally
dangerous  activities, nuisance,  and manufacturing  and design  defects in consumer products. See,
e.g.,  Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,  20 Cal. 3d 413,  573  P.2d 443  (1978);  Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co.,  26  N.Y.2d  219,  287  N.E.2d  870,  309  N.Y.S.  2d  312  (1970);  RESTATE  ENT  (SEcoND)  oF
ToRTs,  §§ 519-20,  402A,  826.
72.  See generally Schwartz,  supra  note  28.
73.  One commentator embellishes  the claim  of systematic judicial  bias  against new  technol-
ogies with two rather odd  as well as unsupportable  assumptions.  See Huber, supra note 54,  at
323-24,  332.  The first is  that epidemiologic and  other scientific studies  can identify the risks of
new  technology  but not its benefits.  Any cursory  review  of the relevant  medical  and  scientific
literature  undermines  this  claim,  and  it  is  certainly  in  the  interest  of  the producers  of new
technology  to sponsor  benefit as  well  as risk studies.  The  second assumption  is  that defendant
firms  are  not  effective  advocates  because  they  tend  to  exaggerate  the  benefits  of their  new
technologies,  even to  the point  of intentionally  misleading  the courts.  While this  is  a problem,
it  is  one that the  confrontational  features  of the adversary  system  are  specifically  designed  to
solve.  Moreover, it would hardly  be conducive  to the maintenance  of orderly process to reward
defendant  firms  with an exemption  from tort liability  for  such abusive behavior.
74.  Injecting  so much bureaucratic  justice into the tort system necessarily raises  the question
of whether the deterrence and compensation  functions of the tort system ought to be transferred
to an  administrative  agency.  Contrary to the  strong but unexplained  faith some commentators
have expressed  in the administrative  solution, see, e.g.,  Huber,  supra note 54,  at 330 (waxing
to the point of revealing  naIvet6:  e.g.,  administrative agencies  will make the correct cost-benefit
decision  "because  their  focus  is  a  relentlessly  public one."  Id.  at  332);  Sugarman,  supra note
6, at 651-54,  660  (1985)  (placing chief reliance  on agency regulation  while noting  parenthetically
that  there are  some problems  with the administrative  solution),  the merits  of such  a solution
are  far from  unambigious.  The  history  of regulatory  laxity,  timidity,  and even  co-optation  in
regard  to  certain  large-scale  risks  does  not  generate  optimism.  J.  ARTABANE  &  C.  BATMER,
DEFuSINo  THE ASBEsTos  LITIGATION  CEISIS: THE  RESPONSIBILITY  OF TBE U.S.  GOVERNMENT  (1986);
see Slawson,  The Right to Protection  from Air Pollution, 59  S.  CAL.  L. Rav.  667,  718  (1986).
Indeed,  abandonment of the tort  system in  favor of an administrative  solution  would sacrifice
the vital role played by plaintiff attorneys in developing  and publicizing evidence of mass torts
affecting the health of thousands of people,  as well  as administrative failure to respond  in timely
and  adequate fashion.  See In re "Agent  Orange"  Prod.  Liab.  Litig.,  611  F. Supp.  1267,  1269
(E.D.N.Y.  1985).
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volved.75  Theories  of distributional  fairness  range  along  a  spectrum  from
traditional  notions  of  corrective  justice  to  less  fault-laden  norms  holding
that the beneficiaries  of risky activity should bear the losses of the relatively
few  who  are  injured. 76  Because  of  its  individualistic  premises,  corrective
justice will provide the critical perspective  from which to evaluate the attempt,
undertaken  in  the balance  of this  paper,  to  locate  significant  intersections
between individual  and bureaucratic justice.
Conventionally,  the  theory  of  corrective  justice  is  generated  from  three
axioms.77  First,  the  value  of  individual  entitlements  to  personal  security
should  be  protected  against,  at  a  minimum,  wrongful  or  nonconsensual
invasions. 7 8  Second,  those who have not in fact invaded the personal security
of the victim or who  have not done  so wrongfully  should be free from legal
responsibility  for the  victim's  loss.  Third,  victims  should  be made whole-
restored  to their  pre-accident  distributional  positions-by  anyone  who  has
wrongfully  invaded  their  entitlements to  personal  security.
Because money judgments can never in principle or reality provide a perfect
substitute  for  the right  not  to  be  wrongfully  harmed  in  the  first  place,  a
postulate of rights-based deterrence  should supplement the traditional prem-
ises  of corrective  justice.
79  Pursuant to  this augmented  theory  of corrective
justice, the function of the tort system is to protect rights to personal security
75.  See Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements,  Rights, and  Fairness:  An Experimental Examination
of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J.  LEGAL STUD.  259  (1985).
76.  The  latter type  of theory  may  address  only  situations  where  the  injured  are strangers
and  not  within  the  benefitting  class,  or  may  apply  broadly  to  potential  beneficaries  as  well
through  complex  causal,  collective  good,  and  probabilistic  foresight  arguments.  Because  the
goods which benefit society as a whole cannot feasibly be produced without some risk of personal
injury,  it is  reasonable  to extrapolate  from principles  of personal  autonomy a duty  on the part
of society to compensate  those statistically destined  to suffer the losses, which in effect constitute
the inevitable human  overhead  of the given social  enterprise.  Such  an  expansive conception  of
causal  relationships  could  logically extend  to support  universal  social  health insurance.
77.  See generally  R. NozIcK,  ANARcHY,  STATE AND  UToPIA 54-87 (1975);  Coleman, Corrective
Justice and Wrongful Gain,  11  J.  LEcAL  STUD.  421  (1982);  Epstein,  Causation and Corrective
Justice: A  Reply to Two Critics, 8 J.  LEGAL  STrU.  477,  489  (1979);  Fried, supra note 8, at  120-
21.
78.  Corrective justice is actually a structure for analyzing questions of distributional  fairness.
Definitions  of "wrongful"  conduct,  appropriate  "consent,"  and  culpable  "invasions"  are  sup-
plied  by,  and  will  vary  according  to,  fundamental  moral  and social  values.  See Fried,  supra
note  8; Posner,  supra note 8.
Rights  against  wrongful  invasions  of  personal  security  do  not  necessarily  imply  absolute
entitlements  to be free  from all  injury. Generally,  injury would not constitute a  rights-violation
if the victim  consents.  Actual  or implied  consent  would  be  sufficient  to absolve  an  injurer  of
liability  when  the benefits  of risk  bearing exceed  its costs.  The  problem of determining whether
to impose liability  is complicated  by considerations  of distributional  fairness.  If the riskbearers
are poor,  for example,  the mere  fact that their gain from the benefits of risky  enterprise make
them  better off than  they  would be  if the enterprise  were  not  undertaken  may  be  insufficient
reason to justify a denial of compensation. It would be especially  difficult to justify leaving the
loss  where  it lies when  the enterprise  yields  disproportionately  greater  gains  for wealthier  than
for  poorer  segments  of society.
79.  See generally Rosenberg,  supra note 7, at  879.
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not only  by compensation  after-the-fact,  but also  by policing  the behavior
of would-be rights violators to prevent wrongful infliction of incompensable
losses-harms  which  cannot  be  compensated  ex post.  Recognition  of  this
rights-based  deterrence function will have a practical effect on rule selection.
Rules which appear appropriate when the focus is exclusively on the amount
of ex  post  compensation  victims  receive  may prove  inadequate  when  com-
pared to deterrence-based  approaches.  While the deterrance-based  approach
might  promise  a lower  amount of ex  post compensation,  ultimately it may
provide  greater protection  for the  rights at stake by reducing  the chance  of
wrongful  infliction of substantial  incompensable  loss.
It is difficult to credit any rights-based objection  to the cost savings  from
class  actions that  make the tort  system  accessible  for  otherwise  low-value,
unmarketable  claims-claims  which  are too  costly and  uncertain to  attract
contingent  fee  investments  by  competent  plaintiff  attorneys.  Nor  is  there
ground  for objection  when  such  claims  can  only  gain  access  by averaging
causation  and  damages  to  eliminate the  expense  of individualized  determi-
nations  in a series  of trials .following  resolution of the common  questions.
Access,  of  course,  need  not  always  require  averaging  on  an  equal  shares
basis  to  eliminate  the  costs  of individualization.  In  some  cases,  claimants
seeking  access  to the system  may find it in their  interest  to  accept  a higher
percentage  contingent  fee  rather  than  an  incremental  broadening  of  the
classifications  for averaging in the direction of treating the victim population
as  an undifferentiated  whole.
Significant rights-based  objections to mass tort class  actions  arise in  con-
nection  with  claims  that would  gain  access  to the  system  without the  cost
savings  afforded  by aggregate  and  averaging  processes.  Achieving  process
efficiency at the  expense  of these claimants'  substantive  rights  would  seem
offensive  to  notions of individual  justice.s0 However,  opposition  to  aggre-
gative treatment  of otherwise  marketable  claims  is  often  mistakenly  predi-
cated  on  a  definition  of  the  baseline  of  an  individual's  substantive  rights
that uncritically equates individual justice with separate actions."  It is simply
assumed that  any benefits claimants  may derive  from proceeding  separately
from one another  are necessarily  entailed  by the  substantive rights they are
asserting.  Thus,  arguments that class treatment deprives  claimants  of power
to control the destiny of their cases frequently  confuse  the substantive  right
of action with  advantages  gained by strategic  exploitation  of the process.
Class  actions  undoubtedly  interfere,  for  example,  with  the  freedom  of
claimants  to select the  available venue  having the highest  award  reputation,
or to present the  case  in a  manner that  prevents  the jury  from  developing
80.  See Blum  & Kalven,  Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Com-
pensation Plans,  31  U.  Cm. L.  REv.  641  (1964).
81.  See, e.g.,  Trangsrud, supra note 6.
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a multiple claim perspective that might induce it to moderate its compensation
or punitive damage  award.  But such opportunistic  manipulation of judicial
processes to secure a systematically biased or myopic forum hardly comports
with notions  of even-handed  fairness  implicit in  corrective justice.82 Correc-
tive justice similarly  would appear  to offer little support  for the proposition
that individuals  are entitled  to have the public subsidize  their personal  pref-
erence  for  separate  lawsuits  to  relitigate  common  questions.  The  fact  that
tort  litigation  confers  public  benefits-including  deterrence  of  socially  in-
appropriate  risks,  delivery  of  compensation  to  victims,  fair  and  peaceful
resolution  of disputes,  and  the  elaboration  of legal  norms-certainly  does
not  require  committing  public  resources  beyond  the point  of negligible  re-
turn. 3
The  gap  between  individual  and  class  actions  is  far  narrower  in reality
than  rights-based  critics  of public  law  processes  appear  to  recognize.  In
contrast to the  ideal of individual  actions,  the  dominant feature of the  tort
system in practice  is the bureaucratic justice  of settlement.  Well  over ninety
percent of all claims  are resolved by settlements,  which are predicated  upon
relatively  standardized  valuation  criteria  that  reflect  the  average  outcomes
derived  from  sets  of  similar cases.84  Mass tort  claims  in particular  usually
result  in  patterned  settlements  prescribing  schedules  of  varying  levels  of
recovery for groups  of victims  defined  by types of injury or other pertinent
and  easily  detectable  characteristics." 5  Moreover,  given  the doctrine of stare
decisis, the notion of individual control  has  little relevance  to  questions  of
law, since their determination in the first case appealed  will govern  all future
cases arising in the same jurisdiction. 86 Nor is the choice  exclusively between
82.  As Professor  Coffee  notes,  it hardly seems unfair  that class  actions  serve to counter the
plaintiff strategy of using separate plunitive  damage  actions  to expose  defendants  to "cumulative
punishment  and,  loosely  speaking,  a  kind of double jeopardy."  Coffee, supra note  15.
83.  See Posner,  The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53  U.  Cm. L.  Ray.  366,  392-93  (1986).
The  strategic  gains  from  public  subsidies  for  separate  actions  are  in  any event  likely  to  be
illusory.  Because  victims  are and  were  both consumers  and  taxpayers,  they  will  be charged  or
taxed  for  a substantial  portion  of the extra  costs.  They  will pay  the  balance,  if any,  in higher
attorney  fees and  litigation  expenses.
84.  See supra note  15.
85.  See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange"  Prod. Liab.  Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740; Wellington, Asbestos:
The Private  Management of a Public  Problem, 33  CLEV.  ST.  L.  REV.  375  (1984-85)  (proposing
a comprehensive program,  based  on the agreement of the manufacturers,  insurers and plaintiff
attorneys to settle all  outstanding personal injury asbestos claims on the basis of a damage schedule
applied  through  an arbitration  mechanism).
86.  Generally,  there  is  no  reality  to  the  notion  that  claimants  have  significant  personal
influence or involvment,  let alone control regarding the course of litigation and settlement,  other
than wielding some  degree of ultimate veto  power over  the settlement price. See Williams, supra
note  17.  Although  some  commentators  suggest that  the lawyer's dominant  role is  the  product
of professional  elitism,  see,  e.g.,  Simon,  The Ideology of Advocacy:  Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978  Wis.  L.  Rav.. 29,  the  more  persuasive  explanation  for  the  control
exercised by lawyers at least in personal injury  cases is that under the contingent  fee arrangement
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class  treatment  and  opting  out  to  an  individual  action.  Bifurcated  class
actions offer the cost savings of aggregate adjudication of common questions
along with respect for the power of claimants to obtain and control through
their  own  counsel  an  individual  trial  on  damages  and  other  noncommon
questions.
87
Rights-based  criticism  faults  class actions  for encouraging  class  attorneys
to strike  "sweetheart"  settlements  with defendants,  trading a portion of the
compensation due victims  for a premium  on,  or merely  the certainty of, the
fee  recovery.  This  form  of lawyer  disloyalty  is  clearly  not  created  by  the
class  action  procedure;  it  is  an  ineradicable  feature  of  every  settlement
negotiation,  especially  in the  personal  injury  context  of plaintiff  attorneys
repeatedly bargaining with the same defendant representatives  or, more likely
their  insurers,  and  providing  their  services  under  contingent  fee  arrange-
ments.8"  But because  of the  aggregate  stakes  involved and  authorization for
pervasive judicial scrutiny of fees and settlements,  the incentives  for plaintiff
attorney  disloyalty  are  likely  to be  lower  in  class  actions  than  in separate
actions.
It is  true  that when plaintiff attorneys  have  only  a fractional  interest  in
the recovery  under a contingent  fee arrangement,  they will invest less  in the
claim than  would claimants  who  possess  sufficient  resources to  finance the
litigation themselves.  Yet,  that differential in interest  (termed "conflict"  by
some)  may  be  negligible  in  most  class  actions  because. they  increase  the
lawyer's stakes,  aligning the  optimal points of investment preferred by both
attorney  and  client.  Because  the attorney's  stake in a  class  action  is  many
times greater  than  it is  in  a separate  action,  the attorney's  investment  will
also  be  far  greater  in  the  class  tharr in  a  separate  action.  Despite  having
only a fractional interest, the class attorney will have sufficient  incentives to
invest at  the  level  which  closely  approximates  if it  does  not  equal  the  in-
vestment  level  claimants  able  to finance  their  own  litigation  would  regard
as optimal.  While the interests  of lawyer and claimants  in class  actions  are
asymmetric,  the  claimant  having  a  much  larger  expected  interest  in  the
outcome than the contingent  fee class attorney,  this differential  is irrelevant
as long as the lawyer's  interest is sufficiently great to warrant an investment
they  are the  principle  risk bearers.
The myth  of personal  control might be tolerated  as a quaint  and  rhetorical reminder  of how
far the common  law of torts has moved from a private law mode of resolving  disputes towards
a system of regulating  the risks  of social enterprise based  upon bureaucratic  standardization of
claim recognition  and redress.  Compare the prediction  in Holmes,  Path of the Law,  10  HARv.
L. Rzv. 457,  467  (1897).  But when this myth is trotted out to excuse the needless and destructive
costs  of case-by-case  processing of mass  tort claims,  the time  for its abandonment  is  at hand.
87.  See supra note  32.
88.  See generally F. MAcKiNNON,  CorrMNoET  FaEs FoR  LEGAL  SEavicas  (1964);  H.  Ross,
supra note 17;  Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal
Injury Litigation, 22  STAN.  L.  REv.  1125  (1970).
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at the claimant's  optimal  level.  Asymmetry  in the stakes  does not preclude
a common point of optimal investment;  for example, regardless of the stakes
a party  will pay  no  more than the market rate for the best available  expert
witness. 8 9
The problem of attorney disloyalty is compounded,  according to the critics,
by conflicts  among  claimants  concerning  distribution  of  settlement  funds.
In order to win claimant  approval for the settlement, the class attorney  may
propose to distribute the fund  according to  a schedule  which disproportion-
ately favors  the  numerous  low value  claims  over usually  far  less  numerous
high value claimsY°  The potential  for such extortionate  behavior by factions
with  lower  value  claims,  as  well  as  the  potential  for  plaintiff  attorneys  to
strike  a  "sweetheart"  settlement  with  the  defendant,  can  be  checked  by
subclassing  and judicial  supervision  of the  settlement.9 1 Because  the  value
of claims can easily and objectively be differentiated by the severity of injury
and the  amount of economic  losses,  both  subclassing  and  judicial  scrutiny
of proposed  settlement  distributions  are  effective safeguards.9
89.  Cf. Coffee, supra note 15  (noting that in high damage  class actions the asymmetric stakes
of plaintiff attorneys  and  defendant  firms may not create  the incentives  for abusive  tactics  by
the latter  that such  asymmetry would in separation  actions).
Professor  Coffee notes the prevalence of the "lodestar  formula"  in setting class attorney  fees,
and  the  potential  for  this  time-based  approach  to  create  incentives  for  the  class  attorney  to
negotiate collusive  "sweetheart"  agreements  with  defendants.  See  Coffee,  supra note  15.  His
analysis,  however,  overlooks the formula's  allowance  for  adjustments  to provide  risk,  success,
and benefit premiums-designed to  encourage  competent attorneys to undertake  and adequately
prosecute  complex  class  actions.  See  Blum v.  Stenson,  465  U.S.  886  (1984).  Courts use  these
adjustments  to prevent collusive settlements.  In addition, judicial  scrutiny of the settlement and
class  attorney fee  deters  collusion.
For these reasons and because promising alternatives exist, it is premature for Professor Coffee
to call for a return to the "traditional  'salvage value'  or 'percentage  of the recover'  fee formula."
Coffee,  supra note  15.  Among  the  alternatives  that  should  be  investigated  are the  use  of
a bidding  process to  select  the class attorney and  the authorization  for  attorneys to purchase
claims  outright  from  victims.  See Rosenberg,  supra note  7;  Shukaitis,  A  Market in Personal
Injury Tort Claims (1986)  (Discussion Paper, Program in Law and Economics at Harvard Law
School).  The  winning  bid  would  provide  a  basis  for  gauging  the  success  of and  appropriate
compensation  for the actual  outcome achieved  by the class attorney.  Allowing  the class attorney
to  purchase  claims  for  their  expected  value  minus  costs  would  eliminate  conflicts  of interest
between  the class  and the class  attorney.  See also Clermont & Currivan,  Improving the Contin-
gency Fee, 63  eoRNELL L. Ray.  529  (1978).  Such alternatives  represent the productive possibilities
that  have been  suppressed  by  anti-competitive  regulation  of the  market  for  legal  services  in
personal  injury  cases,  such  as  the  prohibitions  against  solication,  barratry,  champerty,  and
maintenance.
90.  As  Professor  Coffee points  out,  such  redistribution of compensation  entitlements  from
high to low value claimants may occur independently of class attorney disloyalty.  If, for example,
class  approval of the settlement  requires a simple or super majority vote of all  claimants, where
each  claimant has  an equal vote (or  at least  where  the voting  power  carries a weight  exceeding
the claimant's  relative  entitlement  share  of the  settlement  fund),  it  is possible  that a  coalition
of lower value  claimants  will  form  and  threaten  to  block  settlement  as a  means  of extracting
some  side-payment  from the  higher  value claimants.  See Coffee, supra note  15.
91.  Both  subclassing and  judicial  approval of settlement  are  authorized  by  FED.  R.  Cirv.  P.
23.
92.  Professor Coffee, recognizing the similarities between factional conflicts in plaintiff classes
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Critics recognize that class settlements are subject to judicial oversight and
approval,  but they argue that transaction costs will prevent dissatisfied  class
members  from  organizing  to make an  effective  case in  opposing the  settle-
ment.  In the absence of an effectively  organized  opposition, courts  will lack
sufficient  impetus  to  conduct  a  searching  review  of proposed  class  settle-
ments. 9 3  These  concerns  appear  misplaced.  First,  the  cost  barrier  to  orga-
nization  is  far  more  realistic  in  small  claim  class  actions,  such  as  those
typically  involving  consumer, securities,  and corporate  fraud cases,  than  in
mass tort  class  actions-especially  where  the claims  are  marketable  as  sep-
arate actions-involving severe personal injury.94 A second reason why doubts
about the  effectiveness  of  class  opposition  to  settlement  are  overbroad  is
that  they fail  to  distinguish  between  the  ability  and  incentives  of the  class
representative to supervise the class attorney's day-to-day litigation decisions,
and  the ability  and  incentives  of all  class  members-whose  stakes  are pre-
sumably  quite  high  given  that  their  claims  were  individually  marketable
despite the enormous litigation costs-to  organize when their interests  have
been  focused  and merged by  the proposed  settlement. 9 5
The danger of class attorney disloyalty and extortionate behavior by lower
value claimants cannot be denied nor can it be policed perfectly, and certainly
the  costs  of judicial  intervention  might  be  substantial.9 6 Yet,  if the  choice
of seeking  class  certification  is  left  to  plaintiffs,  there  is  a  countervailing
danger,  more grounded  in  reality,  that plaintiff  attorneys  will sabotage  the
possibility of a class treatment to preserve their contingent fees,  disregarding
and in the labor union context,  correctly observes  that the defendant  like an employer  engaged
in collective  bargaining  may play subclasses  off against  each other.  See Coffee, supra note  15.
But,  as in labor negotiations,  subclasses  can counter  such a strategy by  coordinating  the  timing
and  substance  of their bargaining  positions.  The  labor analogy  also  teaches that  the strongest
faction,  which  in the  class  context  would  be the subclass  comprising  the  highest value claims,
can resist whipsaw tactics because it has a sufficient basis for making a credible threat of forcing
the defendant  into a costly trial (the equivalent of going on strike).
Judicial  review of class  settlements provides  additional,  if not a wholly sufficient,  protection
against  strategic  bargaining  by  defendants.  Any  possibility  that settlements  with  subclasses  of
lower  value  claims  will  exhaust defendant  assets  can  be  dealt  with  by  the court's  suspending
distribution of all or part of the settlement proceeds  until after the higher value claims are tried.
93.  See Dam, supra note  17.
94.  See id.
95.  Indeed,  the court might  facilitate  such  organization  by  appointing  a lawyer  to oppose
the settlement.
96.  But recognizing  the risk  does not concede the reality. There is no empirical evidence  that
settlements  disproportionately  favoring  relatively  low  value  claimants  have  actually  occurred.
Moreover,  the mere skewing of recovery  in favor of lower value claims would not be sufficient
evidence  of attorney  disloyalty.  The  tilt  might  well  be  explained by the  fact that  more  severe
injuries  are likely  to  entail  greater  complexity,  and  hence  disproportionately  greater  litigation
expense.
In  addition,  taxing  relatively  high value  claimants  for  the benefit  of low  value claims  that
might otherwise  be  unmarketable to  the plaintiff class attorney is  not unfair  when the transfer
confers  gains upon the high value claimants  in terms of the enhanced  deterrence  value from an
increase  in  the overall  liability threat.  See  Rosenberg,  supra note 7,  at 917-18.
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the  interests  of victims.  Plaintiff attorneys  are likely  to  be  abetted  in  this
effort by their professional  counterparts  on the defense  side,  whose fees are
equally threatened  by  class  action efficiencies.
Deciding  whether  an  expression  of  dissatisfaction  with  class  treatment
serves  the interests  of the plaintiffs  or their  attorneys will  be  difficult  only
when the cost saving from class treatment is relatively low, and the settlement
schedule substantially  diverges  from generally established  compensation pat-
terns  for severity  of injury and  amounts  of economic  loss  involved.  While
those  conditions  are  unlikely  to  obtain  in  mass  tort  cases  involving  high
value  claims,  courts might  avoid  the  costs of detecting  whether the  motive
for opposition to class treatment is attorney disloyalty by allowing subclasses
of  dissatisfied  claimants  to  opt  out  of  the  proposed  settlement  class  to
prosecute individual damage trials. Permission for this limited opt-out should
be granted  only on the  condition that the  exiting  claimants  pay their  share
of the litigation  costs  and  fees relating to the  class attorney's  discovery  and
other  work  in  preparing the plaintiffs'  case  on the  common  questions.  To
further deter  attorney  disloyalty,  opt-out  claimants  should  also  be required
to pay a user fee equal to the public costs of conducting the separate damage
trials.
97
II.  INTERSECTIONS  OF  INDWIDuAL  AND  BUREAUCRATIC  JUSTICE
This section  redirects the  focus from concerns  about cost and information
barriers  as  justifications  of  mass  tort  class  actions  to  individual  justice
considerations.  The  present  inquiry  asks  whether  the  ends  of  individual
justice-the  tailored  application  of  governing  norms  to  the  circumstances
and  interests  of the  particular  parties-may  be  more  effectively  served  by
class  treatment  of  mass tort  claims  than  by the  system's  traditional  disag-
gregative  process. For purposes of this  inquiry it is assumed that neither the
quality of nor the expense  of developing post-accident information regarding
issues  of causation  and  damages  makes  class  treatment  necessary  or  expe-
dient. Class treatment  of mass  accident claims,  for example,  is not required
because efforts to particularize causal relationships  into small reference groups
or even down to the level  of individuals  is  impractical,  or,  indeed,  because
97.  A  sinfilar approach,  albeit  without  the user  fee component,  is  being  developed  for  the
comprehensive  settlement  of personal  injury claims  arising  from  occupational  exposure  to  as-
bestos.  See Wellington,  supra note  85.  Professor  Coffee  suggests  an  effective  and  perhaps
complementary  solution,  which  would limit  the plaintiff  attorney  fees to  that  portion  of any
damages  recovered in the individual  actions  in excess  of what the claimant would  have received
under  the class  settlement.  See Coffee, A  Policy Primer on Class Action Reform,  62 IND.  L.
J.  625  (1987);  cf. FED.  R.  Civ.  P.  68.
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causal indeterminacy may actually increase when the data is stratified. 8 Thus,
it  is  assumed  that there are  neither  cost  nor information  barriers  to  deter-
mining the ratio of excess  risk to background  risk in a mass toxic tort case
in terms  of a  hierarchy  of  discrete,  relatively  homogeneous  subclasses  or
even in terms  of the  personal  "risk  portfolio"  of each victim.
Even  under  these  assumptions  about  accurate  information  and  low  ad-
ministrative  costs,  the  use  of which  make  disaggregative  processes  unreal-
istically  plausible,  there  are  important  areas  where  the  ends  of individual
justice are better  served  by  public  law processes.  These  intersections  where
collective  processes  reinforce  individualism  have  one  prominent  common
feature:  each  involves  situations in  which  the  ex  ante relationship  between
the  parties  entails  distributive  effects  resulting  from  the  class-wide  risk  of
accident,  effects  which  have  legal  significance  according  to the substantive
and  remedial  norms  of tort law.  Because  of the tort  system's  traditional
disaggregative  processes,  however,  these  ex  ante  distributional  effects  are
likely to be ignored  in the determination  of liability  and damages.
These  processes,  which  trained  attention unrelentingly  on the particulars
of each  claim,  tend  to  predispose  courts  in conducting  their  retrospective
accident  investigations  to view the  causal  relationship  between  a plaintiff's
ex  post  injuries  and  the  defendant's  ex ante  conduct  as  linear  and  deter-
minate.  Constrained to focus on the tangible specifics of this direct and one-
to-one  conception  of the  causal  relationship,  courts are  apt  to neglect  the
systemic,  class-wide  nature  and  distributional  effects  of the  mass  accident
risk in the ex ante context.  Judicial myopia is fairly assured  by the fact that
when  individual  claimants  proceed  by  separate  rather  than  class  actions,
none  will have  sufficient  incentives  to develop  information  regarding  these
ex ante  conditions.  This  is  because  the  costs  of production,  which  usually
exceed the value of such information in any given case,  cannot be recouped
from the  other  claimants  who  will  share  in  its  benefits.  By  preventing,  or
at least strongly  inhibiting,  inquiry into the  class-wide nature and effects  of
the  niass  accident  risk  in the  ex  ante context,  disaggregative  processes  un-
dermine the objectives of individual justice: tailored determination of liability
and  damages.
The balance  of this section  elaborates  the ex ante distributional effects  of
disaggregative  processes  on application  of the  due  care  liability  norm  and
the  make-whole  remedial  norm.  It  also  demonstrates  that  the  ends  of in-
98.  In some  degree of correspondence,  causal  uncertainty  will  increase  as the  risk  criteria
for  subgrouping  the exposed  population become  more  refined.  Not only is  it possible  that the
reliability of causal inferences will diminish as the subgroup becomes smaller and more distinctive.
See Epstein,  supra note 24, at  1380;  Wright,  Causation  in Tort Law, 73  CAUF.  L.  Rnv.  1735,
1823-24 (1985).  But indeterminacy may also arise because assigning relative values to stratification
factors and  determining  the order  in which they are  added to derive subgroup  boundaries inject
other elements  of significant  ambiguity  into  the picture.  See Lagokos  & Mosteller,  supra note
38;  Rosenberg,  supra note  38.
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dividual  justice in  the  application  of these  norms  may  require  abandoning
the  dissagregative  process  in  favor  of the  collective  means  of bureaucratic
justice.
A.  The Due  Care Liability Norm and the Inseparable  Nature of
Ex Ante Risks
The due care  standard of liability requires courts to compare the accident
prevention  efforts made by the defendant  against the probable  loss that will
result from  varying  levels  of care.  In rights-based terms,  due  care mediates
between competing entitlements of autonomy, action and security by defining
limits  to the  risks  one may  impose  on another.  Risk  imposition  is not  per
se  an infringement of right,  but at some point the risk/benefit  ratio  will  be
found excessive  and  grounds  for  holding the  defendant  liable.
Disaggregative  processes  may,  however,  prevent  courts from  recognizing
excessive mass  accident risk in the case  of victims whose losses are relatively
low.  When  considered  in  isolation,  the  potential  loss  of  each  such  victim
will  appear  insignificant  compared  to the care taken  by the defendant  firm.
The  firm's  investment in accident  prevention  will indeed dwarf the interests
at stake  for  any  given  victim,  even  those  who  suffer  relatively  high value
losses.  This results from the fact that, in mass  accident  situations, the firm's
accident  prevention  measures  are  of necessity  the product  of a  collective,
undifferentiated  assessment  of the probable  loss  from  its  activities  for  the
class  of  potential  victims  as  a  whole;  and,  correspondingly,  care-taking
usually cannot  be adjusted  on an individualized  basis.
Because  mass  accident  risks are  indivisibly  imposed  on  the  class,  an  ac-
curate determination  of whether firms  have taken appropriate  care  requires
that courts, like the firms themselves,  sum the expected losses for all members
of the at-risk population,  making the  comparison  of both the  care and loss
factors  on a  class-wide  basis.  Disaggregative  processes,  however,  may  lead
a court to focus on the probable loss for the particular claimant  in the case,
and  compare  it to the  care that the defendant  has  taken,  which  necessarily
is  class-wide  in  character.  Such  an  asymmetrical  derivation  of  the  care-
probable loss  ratio  would  support denial  of liability  for  the  relatively  low
value claims.  For if each case is treated as separately  arising from a discrete
relationship  between  the  defendant  firm  and  the  particular  claimant,  the
court will  frequently  find that the defendant's  class-wide  investment  in care
more than  satisfies  the concern  it owed  to the victim.
In rights-based terms, such comparisons of individual expected loss to class-
wide  care is  distributionally unfair in two  respects.  First, to deny liability on
low value claims  deprives those victims  of legal protection  for their rights of
personal  security. Second,  denial of liability on those claims  also reduces the
protections  from  the  deterrent  effect  of threatened  liability  for the  class  as
a whole. The interest of potential victims  in deterrence,  which  is undermined
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by disaggregative  process,  is  unitary for the class;  regardless  of the value  of
their  future  claims  should  they  incur injury,  when  a  significant  number  of
the  claims  will  not  be  redressed,  each  member  of the  at-risk  population
experiences  an ex ante devaluation of entitlements  measured  by the increased
chance  of suffering  incompensable  loss.99
To illustrate,  suppose that in the course of operating  a nuclear  power plant
radiation  accidentally  is  released  into  the atmosphere.  For the sake of sim-
plicity,  assume that only two people, A and B,  reside within the danger zone,
and  that they live  on opposite  sides of the plant.  If the winds  blow in each
direction  fifty percent  of the  time,  each  has  an  equal  chance  of suffering
radiation  related  disease should an  accident  occur.  If the winds blow in A's
direction, the compensable loss will be $100  and an equal amount, figuratively
speaking, in incompensable  suffering.  Should the winds blow in the opposite
direction,  B  will incur  $10  in compensable  losses  and the notional equivalent
loss  for which  damages  are  neither  a principled  nor  practical  substitute.  In
this rights-based  world, A,  B,  and the nuclear  power firm  share the benefits
of  the  firm's  activity,  and  as  contracting  parties  they  are  presumably  in
agreement that due care requires  the firm to invest up to but not beyond the
optimal  amount in safety. Existing technology permits  the firm to  affect the
chance  of an  accidental  release of radiation only incrementally  according to
the following  levels  of safety investment:
Expected  Loss  for
Level  of Care  Investment  Chance  of Accident  A(100) or  B(10)
#1  0  .5  A=50  B=  5
#2  19  .2  A=20  B= 2
#3  40  .001  A=.l  B  =.01
On these  assumptions,  the  firm  can  satisfy  the  due  care  requirement  by
investing  at level #3. Accident  costs are minimized when 40 is invested;  while
the  marginal  cost  of care  for  the  firm  increases  by  21  over  the  level  #2
investment,  the marginal  decrease  in the total  expected  loss is  21.89.100  The
decrease in total expected  loss should be doubled to reflect the incompensable
loss  savings  produced  by a level  #2 investment.
Suppose that the accidental  release  occurs  and the  wind is  blowing  in B's
direction.  In a subsequent  damage action by B,  it is discovered that the firm
only  made  the  level  #2  investment  of  19.  If the  court  treats  B's  claim  as
99.  See  discussion  of rights-based  deterrence,  supra notes  77-79 and  accompanying  text.
100.  The marginal expected loss saving resulting from investigating 40 instead of 19 is calculated
as follows:  22 (aggregate expected loss at level #2 investment)  minus .11  (aggregate  expected  loss
at  level  #3 investment)  equals  21.89.
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arising  from a relationship  with the firm which  is discrete and separate  from
A's, liability may be denied.  Examining the ex ante context,  the court would
observe  a  ratio  of  care  to  expected  loss  for  B  of  19  to  2.  On  such  an
individualized  appraisal, the firm's care toward B will be seen as due, probably
even  excessive.  B  recovers  nothing and  suffers  incompensable  loss  as  well.
Of  course,  when  it invested  19,  the  firm  ran  the  risk  of injuring  A and
incurring  a negligence  judgement  for  $100.  Yet,  if the  threat  of  liability is
to A  alone,  the  firm  will  not be  induced  ex  ante to  invest  at  level #3. For
the  firm  will  find  it  profitable  to  invest  only  at  level  #2  notwithstanding
potential  liability  to A.  It is  cheaper  for the  firm  to  invest  19  and  bear  an
expected  liability  of  20  (.2  x  100),  for a  total operating  cost  of 39  than  it
would be  to invest 40  and  bear  no liability.
The  most dramatic  effect  of disaggregative  treatment  is  not only that  B's
entitlements  are  entirely  unprotected.  But  it  is  that  A's  rights,  while  fully
protected  against  compensable  losses,  are  devalued  ex  ante  in the  example
by an increase in expected incompensable  loss from  .1 to 20. As the example
plainly illustrates,  the fate of A's entitlements, though fully protected against
compensable  losses,  is  nevertheless  dependent  upon  the  fate  of B's; if A  is
to avoid wrongfully inflicting compensable loss, infringement of B's low value
entitlements  must be redressed.
The  firm  essentially  aggregates  expected  costs  in  the ex  ante context  and
the  court  disaggregates  those  costs  in  making  its  ex  post  determination  of
liability.  Since expected costs  are necessarily  inseparable because  of the class-
wide  nature  of  the  risks  involved,  the  asymmetry  in  ex  ante  and  ex  post
assessments  can  be  corrected  only by judicial  aggregation  of expected  costs
in determining  liability, even in cases where the individual claimant's expected
and  actual losses are relatively low.  To be sure,  mass  accidents  cause injuries
to many  A's and  B's,  and this should be obvious  to the courts  that hear the
resulting  claims.  But  when  these  injuries  arise  over  time  and  are  widely
dispersed,  as is likely  when long-latency  disease  is involved,  the disaggregative
process of separate  actions may lead these courts to make the error of treating
each claim as arising from a separate and discrete relationship between defend-
ant and plaintiff. If a sufficient proportion of the low-value claims are denied
because  a  high  ratio  of  aggregate-care  taking  to  individual  expected  loss
satisfies the due care requirement, then the entire population at-risk, including
those with  relatively high-value stakes,  will suffer serious  incompensable losses.
B.  The Make-Whole Recovery Norm and the Average Response to
Risk Ex Ante
The rights-based tort system promises to restore victims of tortious conduct
to  their  pre-accident  distributional  positions-at  least  with  respect  to  com-
pensable  losses.  At  great  cost,  the  particulars  of each  victim's  injury  are
specifically  examined  and valued to the end of recompensing  no more or less
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than what  was  taken by the defendant's  tortious  conduct.  Yet,  this  process
of particularization  and the presumption  of a linear,  discrete relationship  of
defendant and victim lead courts to ignore the class-wide  response to the risk
of accident by potential  victims  in the ex ante context.  As  a result,  the costs
of such  responses  will be omitted  from the judgment's  accounting of injury
loss.  But  far  more  important,  by  ignoring  the ex  ante response  to  risk  by
potential  victims,  the particularization  of loss  may defeat or impede judicial
efforts  to  comply with  the make-whole norm.  Because  this ex ante response
is  often  formulated  on  a  standardized  basis  for  all  or  large  subgroups  of
potential  victims,  there  may  be  cases  where  determining  compensation  ac-
cording to the class-wide  average  loss may  achieve the  normative goal more
effectively than will  individualized  adjudication.
If, as is  plausible to assume,  the members  of an at-risk population are risk
averse,  the  ex  ante  response  to  the  defendant's  hazardous  activities  will
generally  take  the form  of commercial  or  self-insurance  against losses from
potential  accidents.  When  the  accident  risk  arises  from  a  contractual  rela-
tionship  between the  defendant  and  potential  victims,  the insurance  will  be
provided  along with the product or service involved under compulsion  of the
tort  system. 1"  The  defendant  obtains  the  policy  and  surcharges  consumer-
potential  victims  for the premium.  When the accident risk is imposed outside
of  a contractual  relationship  between  the  defendant  and  potential  victims,
the insurance  response will be designed  to make the actual victims  whole by
supplementing  tort  damage  awards. 10 2 The  premiums  for the tort  insurance
represented  by  damage  awards  are  not paid  for  by  potential  victims,  but
rather  are  charged  to the  defendant  and  its  customers.  Potential victims  in
non-contract  situations,  however,  bear the  costs  of the  supplementary  com-
mercial  or self-insurance that covers  the portion of the loss not compensated
by the  defendant  firm  in  the  damage  award.  The  at-risk  population  thus
would insure  to  make  victims  whole by hedging  against the contingent  and
potentially  partial recovery  in cases  where  questions  of causal indeterminacy
are  resolved  by a preponderance  (all-or-nothing)  or proportionality  (appor-
tionment according  to causal  contribution)  rule.03
Significantly,  the risk insured  against and premium paid  by potential  vic-
tims-regardless  of  whether  the  insurance  is  purchased  under  a  product  or
service  contract  or whether  it is  supplementary  insurance  purchased  outside
of a contractual setting-will often be set or calculated in terms of the average
101.  See Epstein,  Products  Liability as an Insurance  Market,  14 J. LEGAL  STUD.  648  (1985);
Rea, Comments on Epstein, 14  J.  LEGAL  SmTD.  671  (1985);  Moore  & O'Connell,  Foreclosing
Medical Malpractice  Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA.  L. Rnv.  1268  (1984).
102.  Supplemental  insurance  would  cover  the deficit  left  by  the  tort judgment,  including  a
judgement denying  all recovery.
103.  For a general discussion  of the preponderance  and  proportionality  rules, see Rosenberg,
supra note 7.
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expected  loss  from  a given  type  of injury  for  the  at-risk  population  as  a
whole.  This  is generally  true for product-service  insurance where transaction
and  information  costs  are  barriers  to  customized  arrangements.  Regardless
of their particular economic stations in life and risk preferences,  all consumers
will  pay  an  equal  premium  price  under  the  product  or  service  contract  to
cover the same range of hazards. Having purchased the same insurance policy,
the  only  damage  award  that will  restore  victims  of product  or  service  risks
is  one  that  provides  compensation  measured  by the  average  loss.  The  dif-
ferentiation  of damage  awards  according  to  the  individual  victim's  actual
loss-consistent  with  the  disaggregative  process  of the  system-contravenes
the make-whole norm and anti-redistribution principles  implicit in the concept
of individual justice.  The  effort to tailor recovery  to the actual  ex post loss
operates in effect  as a regressive tax,  redistributing income  from the less well
off to the  better  off.
In the absence of a contractual  relationship,  there may be situations where
the  supplementary  ex  ante  insurance  obtained  by  potential  victims  will  of
necessity  be  based on the average probability of causation.0 4 Generally  these
situations  arise when  potential  victims are  confronted  by the prospect,  over
which  they  have  no practical  control,  that  their  injury  will  be  causally in-
determinate.  If, in addition, the probability of causation is  a random factor,
then the ex ante insurance purchased  by victims  will be geared to the average
probability  of causation.  In  order  to  satisfy the  make-whole  norm,  as  will
be  illustrated  below,  such  an  ex  ante  insurance  response  must be  taken  as
prefiguring  the  ex  post  measure  of damages  at  the  average  probability  of
causation.  Individualization  of causal  probabilities,  whether  tailored  to  rel-
atively  small  victim  subclasses,  or-even  if  it  were  possible  to  achieve  the
theoretical  limiting case-tailored  to the  particular  claimant's  circumstances,
will  only  prevent  fulfillment  of the remedial  norm where  the probability  of
causation applicable  to a specific claimant or subclass  is below the average. 1 05
Returning  to  the  nuclear  power  plant  example  for  illustration  of  these
points,  suppose  that the  radioactive  cloud  will  spread  the  risk  of a  certain
type  of cancer  to the  population living  down-wind  of the  site.  Also  assume
that  the  chance  of  being  stricken  by  radiation-related  disease  is  solely  a
function of distance from the plant  site when the cloud is  first encountered,
and members  of the populatioi  are randomly moving  about the  hazardous
zone  so  that  they  have  no  practical  means  of  controlling  the  risk.  If  all
members of the population also bear a uniform background risk of contracting
104.  In  the  mass  tort  context,  the  contractual  and  non-contractual  situations  are  mainly
distinguished by the fact that in the latter both the factors of loss and the probability of causation
are variables,  and hence  each member  of the at-risk  population  has  a differential expected  loss.
105.  This point was  initially  noted  in Rosenberg,  Toxic  Tort Litigation: Crisis or Chrysalis?
A  Comment on Feinberg's Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24  Hous.  L.  Ray.
183  (1987).
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the cancer in question,0 6 then they will rationally purchase insurance according
to the same probability  of causation-i.e.,  the average  for the population as
a whole.  Contemplating  that  compensation  from the tort  system  would  be
apportioned  according  to the  probability  of causation, ° 0  the balance  of the
expected  loss for which  each potential  victim would purchase supplementary
insurance would  be  calculated  on a fifty  percent probability.
If, however,  the probability of causation  is individually determined  in each
subsequent claim by a disease victim, the make-whole norm may be defeated
in a substantial  number  of cases.  Victims  whose probability  of causation  is
below fifty percent because they encountered the radiation cloud at a relatively
remote distance from the plant site will not receive  compensation that makes
them whole.  A victim whose probability of causation  is inferred to be twenty
percent,  for example,  will  receive  compensation  for only  seventy percent of
the injury losses-twenty  percent in tort damages  against the nuclear  power
firm  and  fifty  percent  in  proceeds  from  the  supplementary  insurance  pur-
chased ex ante.  In contrast,  computing  and awarding tort damages  according
to the average  probability of causation for all of the mass tort victims would
make  all of them  whole.
CONCLUSION
Mass  accident  class  actions  achieve  the tort system's  basic  compensation
and  deterrence  goals  far  more  effectively  than its  traditional  disaggregative
processes.  The major purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate  that this
conclusion  remains  true even  when  the  class  action  imports  significant  ele-
ments  of bureaucratic  justice.  Although  such  elements  as  mandatory  class
treatment and damage scheduling make tort liability  extremely potent,  I have
shown  that  the  fears  expressed  by  some  commentators  that  this  will  only
exacerbate  the  system's  potential  for overdeterring  technological  innovation
have little basis in reality. Indeed,  the "public  law"  approach represented  by
class  actions  minimizes  the  incentives  for inefficiency  and  irrationality  that
have  justifiably  raised  concerns  about  whether  the tort  system  is  a sensible
mode  of regulating the  risks  of advanced  technology.
The  bulk  of the  paper,  however,  concerns  the  compatibility  of the bu-
reaucratic justice introduced through means of class actions with the system's
ideal  of doing  individual  justice.  To  test  the  proposition  that  bureaucratic
justice  does  not  subvert,  but  rather  enhances  the tort  system's  capacity  to
achieve individual justice, the paper evaluates  the performance  of class treat-
ment  in  terms  of  the rights-based  conception  of individualistic,  possessory
106.  This  assumption is  made  to simplify the example;  the validity  of the conclusions  would
not be affected  by variable  background  risk factor.
107.  The analysis would be more complicated  if the system used the traditional preponderance-
of-the-evidence rule and all-or-nothing judgments, but it would not result in a different conclusion.
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entitlements to security from wrongful injury. With respect to  class treatment
of common questions the findings  are unambigious.  By  eliminating the inef-
ficiencies  of separate  actions,  mass  accident  class actions  promise  very sub-
stantial increases in compensation for victims.  In addition, by assuring  access
to  the  system  for  relatively  low  value  claims-claims  that  would  not  be
marketable to competent plaintiff attorneys as separate actions-not only are
those  claimants  compensated  for  their  losses,  but  also  the  probability  of
incompensable  loss is  greatly  reduced for  all potential  victims.
When the  aggregative  and  averaging  methods  of bureaucratic  justice are
extended to  noncommon  questions  raised  by  otherwise  marketable  claims-
claims which  do not require  class  treatment  to gain  access  to  the system-a
danger  of  redistribution  from  higher  to  lower  value  claimants  arises.  In
addition,  regardless  of the value of the classed claims,  the class attorney has
incentives  to  make a  collusive  settlement  with  the  defendant,  trading  a  sig-
nificant amount of class recovery  for a higher or certain  attorney fee.  These
problems  are  not unique to  class  actions;  the  settlement  of separate  actions
involves  similar dangers  of redistribution  and  attorney disloyalty. Moreover,
careful  analysis  indicates  that  there is  less  warrant  for concern  about  these
dangers  in the  class  action than  in the  separate  action context.  The  greater
stakes  for  the  class  attorney,  combined  with  the  possibility  for  effective
judicial oversight of settlements and fees minimizes the risks  of redistributibn
and  class  attorney  disaffection.  Judicial  policing  is  not  perfect  nor  are  its
costs negligible.  Therefore,  a market-type  of approach should be adopted in
certain  cases-where the  risks  of redistribution  and class  attorney  disloyalty
and  the costs  of  detecting  them  are high-to  allow  exit  (opting  out) from
the class  action's  aggregative  and  averaged  resolution  of noncommon  ques-
tions,  particularly damages.  To counter  the more serious  danger  of plaintiff
attorneys  opposing class actions  to protect their  fees rather than their client's
interests,  permission  to  opt  out  should  be  conditioned  on  payment  of  the
opt-out  claimant's  share  of  the  costs  incurred  in  preparing  the  common
questions  and of the costs  represented  by the public resources  consumed  by
the individual damage trials.  This compromise  of bureaucratic  justice is con-
sistent  with the  instrumental conception  of process  embodied  in the  "public
law"  model  of the tort  system,  which  seeks  not purity  of form but  simply
to  maximize  substantive productivity.
The most ambitious thrust of this paper is to show that in certain contexts,
even  when there exist  neither cost  nor information barriers  preventing access
to the tort system, the aggregation and averaging of bureaucratic justice better
serves  individual justice  than the  system's traditional  disaggregative  process.
Generally,  this appears to be the case in mass  accident situations  because the
ex ante risk of injury experienced  by the population of exposed victims results
in  uniform  and  collective  distributional  consequences  which  are likely  to  be
ignored  in  assessing  liability and  awarding  compensation  ex post in the  sys-
tem's traditional  process.  In contrast to the probabilistic  and  class-wide  per-
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spectives engendered by the bureaucratic justice of class actions, the traditional
disaggregative  process  tends  to  seek  linear,  determinate,  and  particularized
determinations  of liability  and  compensable  loss.  Necessarily  such  a disag-
gregative  process  will  fail  to  capture  collective  and  statistically  averaged  re-
sponses  to  ex  ante  risk,  even  though  these  responses  have  demonstrable
distributive  consequences  for  the  class  of potential  victims-consequences
which are substantively relevant to prevailing liability and compensation norms.
The paper  sketches  two  examples  indicating  the differences  in distributive
outcomes  under  the  bureaucratic  justice  of  class  actions  and  the  system's
private  law,  disaggregative  processes.  First,  I  show  that  the  disaggregative
approach undermines the collective interest of potential  class victims in rights-
based  deterrence.  Unless  the aggregate  class-wide  risk of an  activity is  com-
pared  to the defendant's  safety investment,  courts  are likely to deny liability
in  cases  involving  low  value  claims.  At  a  certain  point,  especially  in  cases
where the choices  among levels  of care-taking  are discontinuous,  the removal
of such claims from the threat of liability may sharply reduce the defendant's
safety  incentives.  By  thus  increasing  the  risk  of incompensable  loss,  the
system's  disaggregative  process  effectively  devalues  the  security  entitlements
of the at-risk population.
Second,  stimulated  by  conditions  of  ex  ante  risk,  potential  victims  will
purchase  insurance.  When the  risk  is  randomly  distributed  among the  pop-
ulation  of potential  victims,  so that none  has  a distinctive  chance  of being
injured, then  insurance  will be purchased  to cover the average risk borne  by
the population  as a whole.  Where the risk arises in a contractual  setting,  for
example  consumer  product  injuries,  the  insurance  will be  purchased  by the
potential  victim  as  part  of the  product  price.  Because  each  consumer  pays
an  identical  amount  of the  price  as  insurance  premium,  regardless  of the
economic  status each  victim suffering the same physical harm should receive
compensation  in  equal shares  computed  at the  average  level.  Ex post  parti-
cularization ignores the ex ante uniformity of insurance response, and operates
as  a regressive tax  against low-income  consumers.  A similiar  uniform  insur-
ance  response arises in non-contract  settings,  for example when  a population
is subject to  an environmental risk of disease from toxic substance exposure.
If members  of the population cannot  affect the  chance  of injury, then  each
will purchase  insurance  based on the average  probability  for  the population
as a whole. The insurance  they purchase will be supplementary,  covering gaps
in  compensation  provided  by the  tort  system.  However,  if the  ex  post  de-
terminations  are  particularistic,  then a large  number  of victims  who  receive
below  average  (including  zero)  compensation  from  the tort system  will  not
be made whole by their  supplementary insurance.  In order to assure that all
victims  are  made whole  by the  combination  of tort  and private  insurance,
tort compensation  must be provided  to  all victims  on  an average  basis.
These  examples  of the  distributional  effects  of using  private  law  process
suggest  a broader critique  of the traditional  tort system.  Its  basic structure
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is  flawed  because  its linear,  determinate,  and  particularistic  modes  of adju-
dication fail  to  account  for conditions  of uncertainty,  ex post  as well  as  ex
ante. Uncertainty cannot be reduced to absolute values without depriving  one
or the other party of individual justice.  When such conditions of uncertainty
prevail,  only a public law perspective,  implemented through the bureaucratic
modes of mandatory class  actions  and damage scheduling,  through a market
approach  allowing individual  damage trials  as long as  opt-out claimants  pay
their  own way,  or through other means dictated  by the circumstances  of the
accident,  can  do  individual justice.